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The patent system suggests a natural symmetry: if "nonobvious" changes
are enough to distinguish a patentable invention from the prior art, then
further "nonobvious" changes should be enough to avoid infringing the patent.
Logical as this seems, the courts have adopted the notoriously difficult
standard of "insubstantial differences, " rather than nonobviousness, as the
ultimate test of infringement. In this Article, I consider the possibility of a
genuinely symmetrical patent system and find the difficulties profound.
Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. J.D. 1988, University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Dean Kenneth Randall and the University of
Alabama Law School Foundation for their support of this research. Thanks also to
Creighton Miller and Penny Gibson of the Law School Library for their assistance in
locating sources. Finally, I am indebted to Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School and Karl
Kramer of Morrison & Foerster for their comments and suggestions.
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However, I conclude that a semi-symmetrical adaptation of the
nonobviousness standard of patentability could provide a superior
infringement analysis - an analysis more objective in application and more
consistent with the economic framework ofpatent doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
A cherished dream in the physical sciences is the discovery of a Grand
Unified Theory - a common framework that connects, simplifies, and explains
what had been perplexing and seemingly unrelated phenomena. In patent law,
the field of law that most naturally commends itself to scientists, there are two
perplexing and doctrinally separate phenomena - obviousness and equivalence
- whose similarities cry out for a common approach, and perhaps for a unified
theory.'
Obviousness is the key to defining what is a patentable invention. Even if
an invention is new, only if it would have been nonobvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made is it considered
worthy of a patent monopoly. 2 Should the patent be obtained, equivalence is
the ultimate measure of its effective scope. The carefully worded claims with
which a patent concludes define the subject matter that literally infringes the
patent, but courts have long held that equivalents exhibiting only minor
differences are also proscribed.3 Obviousness is a snare for the patentee;
equivalence is the bane of an accused infringer. Yet the two concepts have
much in common. Each extends around a more definite entity a ghostly
penumbra of legal significance. Obviousness expands the obstacles to
patentability posed by the disclosures of the prior art; equivalence broadens the
reach of the patent beyond what the patentee explicitly claimed. The concepts
are, in fact, so conceptually similar that students newly introduced to patent
law often confuse the vocabulary, arguing that a patent should be held invalid
because the prior art was "equivalent," or that infringement should be found
where only "obvious" differences distinguish the accused product from the
claimed invention. The courts, however, have preserved the distinction. A
product infringes by equivalence, they say, not because it is an obvious
variation of the claimed invention, but because the differences are
"insubstantial." '4
1 A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents- the Not-Quite-Holy Grail,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 267, 268 (1996) (comparing attempts to draft an economic theory
of patent law to the quest for "a unifying scientific theory of the universe"). As his title
implies, Oddi finds that none of the theories yet proposed adequately accounts for all
aspects of patent doctrine. Id. at 271.
2 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (stating that a patent may not be obtained for obvious changes
made to prior art); see infra Part I.B (discussing extensively the modem standard of
nonobviousness).
3 See infra Part I.C (discussing extensively the doctrine of equivalents).
I Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 266 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Obviousness is a difficult issue to resolve. It requires one to imagine how a
claimed invention might have looked to a different person (the hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the art) at a different time (the time the invention
was made), and without resorting to hindsight based on knowledge of the
claimed invention (the very invention that is foremost in one's mind). Yet
these difficulties are, in some respects, less severe than those posed by the
"insubstantial differences" test of equivalence. To ask if a difference is
"insubstantial" simply rephrases the question.5 The analysis also lacks the
objective considerations - such as commercial success and the failure of others
- that assist in the obviousness inquiry.6 The inadequacy of the formula, and
the uncertainty of the result, is one of the reasons that the doctrine of
equivalents has been, for more than 150 years, one of the most controversial
aspects of patent doctrine.
The architect of a unified system would be tempted to re-imagine
equivalence, if equivalence there must be, as a symmetrical manifestation of
the obviousness principle. In other words, looking backwards in time from the
date of the invention, what the applicant has added to the prior art must be
nonobvious in order to be patentable; looking forward in time, what the
accused infringer adds to the claimed invention must be nonobvious in order to
avoid infringement. This solution is formally elegant. But it substitutes a
difficult equivalence test for one that is, in many respects, hopeless. The idea
is not so preposterous that others have failed to propose it.7 However, there are
5 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) ("[Tlhe
insubstantial differences test offers little additional guidance [beyond equivalence itself] as
to what might render any given difference 'insubstantial."').
6 Whether A is known, to persons skilled in the art, as a substitute for B is said to be one
objective factor leading to a conclusion that A and B are substantially the same. See Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950); see also infra Part
I.C.2 (discussing the decision and analysis of Graver in further detail, including whether this
factor really illuminates the substantiality of the differences between two patents).
7 See, e.g., Qing Lin, A Proposed Test for Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents to
Biotechnology Inventions: The Nonobviousness Test, 74 WASH. L. REv. 885, 906-07 (1999)
(recommending a two-prong approach to determining equivalence where the first prong
examines whether the accused item was obvious from prior art or surrendered during patent
prosecution and the second prong examines whether the modification made to the patented
item is obvious); Michael T. Siekman, The Expanded Hypothetical Claim Test: A Better
Test for Infringement for Biotechnology Patents Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 2 B.U.
J. ScI. & TECH. L. 6, 10 (1996) (suggesting that an "interchangeability" test is as valid as the
"tripartite" and "substantial differences" tests, but avoids the problems posed by the latter
two); Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis: A Comparative Law
Analysis, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 479, 482 (1996) ("This Article also contends
that the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents should parallel the standard
for nonobviousness."); Roy H. Wepner, The Patent Invalidity/Infringement Parallel:
Symmetry or Semantics?, 93 DICK. L. REv. 67, 80 (1988) ("The standards that govern the
decision to grant (or invalidate) a patent should be, to the extent possible, parallel to the
standards that define what constitutes an infringement."); Joseph S. Cianfrani, Note, An
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at least two considerations that complicate the adoption of an obviousness
standard of infringement - two asymmetries that may account, to some degree,
for the failure of the courts to give the idea more than passing consideration.
8
If obviousness and equivalence are ever to be united in a common framework,
these difficulties must be confronted.
One difficulty is that the baseline for the obviousness determination is, in
the validity context, the disclosures or teachings of the prior art in its entirety.
In an infringement inquiry, the baseline for comparison must be the patented
invention. Even if one were to pay little heed to the principle of claim-based
patenting in the context of equivalence, it would be necessary to anchor the
infringement inquiry to the patentee's contribution to the art. In other words,
one could not condemn all obvious products as infringing in the way that one
can dismiss all obvious claims as unpatentable; the accused product would
have to be obvious in a way that connected it specifically to the claimed
invention. Conversely, some non-obvious differences in the accused product,
including differences unrelated to the patented invention, should be ignored in
an infringement determination. An equivalence test based on obviousness
would have to account for this.
The more serious difficulty is that in a validity context, obviousness is
judged from a fixed moment in time - the time the invention was made.
Infringement, however, can occur at any time during the term of the patent,
and in recent years the courts have increasingly analyzed equivalence in the
Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 53 (1997),
http://www.vjolt.net/vol1/issue/volI artI.pdf (discussing, without enthusiasm, an
obviousness measure of equivalence); Stephen G. Kalinchak, Comment, Obviousness and
the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Striving for Objective Criteria, 43 CATH. U. L.
REv. 577, 582 (1994) (suggesting parallels between obviousness and equivalence and
advocating increased emphasis on objective considerations for the latter).
8 See Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(remarking that, as literal infringement mirrors anticipation, infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents "is somewhat akin to obviousness"). Judge Lourie, concurring in Johnson &
Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en bane),
observed that "[a] patentee seeking to establish equivalence wants to show that the accused
is merely making a minor variation of his invention, an obvious one, not a nonobvious
improvement." In contrast, "[o]ne accused of infringement wants to show that he has made
an important advance, not that he is a copier, and that his device was obvious over the
patented invention, or foreseeable." Id. The function/way/result test of equivalence is, said
Judge Lourie, "a test that is closer to obviousness [than] nonobviousness." Id. Judge Lourie
was responding to the suggestion of Judge Rader, in his own concurring opinion, that
equivalents should be limited to what the patentee could not have foreseen when drafting the
claims. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. In her concurring opinion in Roton
Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996), Judge Nies proposed
more explicitly adopting a nonobviousness test for infringement. See also infra note 215
and accompanying text. The court has not, so far, adopted her suggestion.
[Vol. 87:969
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context of ever-evolving technologies. 9  Indeed, one of the strongest
justifications for the doctrine of equivalents is the inability of patentees to
foresee, when drafting their claims, how the art will later develop. If
equivalence were decided by an obviousness standard, two temporal
perspectives suggest themselves: the time the patent application was filed,' 0 or
the time the alleged infringement occurred. The former would freeze the
patent in time, depriving the patentee of rights against later-discovered
equivalents. The latter poses problems as well. As each non-obvious product
is introduced it becomes itself a part of the knowledge subsequently available
to those skilled in the art. The next party to adopt the same (formerly non-
infringing, but now obvious) variation would not enjoy the protections of the
first. The result would be to give the party who introduced the non-obvious
variation patent-like advantages over its competitors, even if it did not, or
could not, have obtained a patent.
At the cost of some doctrinal asymmetry, it is possible to formulate a hybrid
test of equivalence that preserves the benefits of an obviousness-based inquiry,
anchors the inquiry to the claimed invention, and avoids the worst
consequences of the temporal anomalies described above. The test I will
propose is this: the accused combination is equivalent to the claimed
combination if, at the time the patent application was filed, a person of
ordinary skill in the art, aware of both the claimed combination and the
I See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) ("'Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary
does not always keep abreast of the inventor."' (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United
States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967))); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal
Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The doctrine of equivalents is necessary
because one cannot predict the future.... [A] variant of an invention may be developed
after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so insubstantial a change from
what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an infringement."); see also
Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 161 (2005) ("As of late, the emphasis on the doctrine of
equivalents has focused on protecting one specific type of equivalent termed an 'after-
arising equivalent.').
10 One could also adopt the perspective of the time when the patented invention was made.
This would most closely mirror the obviousness standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
However, the time of filing perspective would match the usual practice for claim
interpretation, enablement, and other standards related to the information communicated by
the patent to persons skilled in the art. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Dekalb Genetics
Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (establishing the temporal perspective to be
applied in enablement inquiries); Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (establishing the temporal perspective to be used in claim interpretation for
literal infringement); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104
MICH. L. REV. 101, 116 (2005) (advocating the time of filing as the best alternative for
interpreting the meaning of claim terminology). In any event, adopting the perspective of
the time when the invention was made, and the perspective of the time when the patent
application was filed, present similar difficulties.
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substituted element, would have found it obvious to make the substitution.
This test will not satisfy those who bridle at the notion of equivalence in
general. Arguably, it takes us even further from the ideal situation in which
the scope of a patent is measured by the language of its claims. It would,
however, be a step toward a unified system of patent law, and it would add
substance and objectivity to the equivalence determination, something the
courts have generally failed to accomplish.
Part I of this Article lays the groundwork for discussion by summarizing the
principles of nonobviousness and infringement by equivalence. Part II
examines the difficulties posed by adopting an obviousness standard of
equivalence, and how the proposed test addresses those difficulties. Part III
concludes with an analysis of the potential advantages of a symmetrical and
obviousness-based system of patent law, including its compatibility with the
leading economic theories of how patents promote innovation while
minimizing its costs.
I. OBVIOUSNESS AND EQUIVALENCE
The goal of the patent system, as expressed in Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution, is to "promote the Progress of... [the] useful
Arts."" Today we might say that the goal is to promote the advancement of
technology. 12 One who discovers a new process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter enjoys, during the term of the patent, the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing into
the United States the invention that is the subject of the patent.1 3  This
exclusive right allows inventors to recoup their costs and to capture at least
some of the value of their contribution to society. While this tends to give
inventors their just deserts, most would agree that the primary beneficiary of
the patent system is the public. If others had perfect freedom to compete with
the inventor by duplicating and selling the invention, the rewards of inventive
activity might be too small to justify the costs, and society would be denied the
benefits of technological advancement. 
14
Society, acting through government, could encourage invention directly by
awarding cash prizes for significant technological advancements. Some might
prefer that system.' 5 But the patent system has the advantage of being, in a
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"2 See Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REv. 1419,
1437-44 (tracing the various courts and scholars who have suggested that modem-day
"useful arts" are equal to "technological arts").
'3 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 271(a) (2000).
14 See Cotropia, supra note 9, at 169-70.
15 See Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 530 (2001) ("Under the reward system, the incentive to invest
is governed by the reward and thus is not systematically inadequate; yet the incentive to
invest is not linked to actual surplus but only to the reward.").
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sense, self-regulating. It is unnecessary to convene a panel of experts to
attempt to determine, perhaps in advance of its full commercial exploitation,
whether a particular invention merits a large prize, a small prize, or no prize at
all. Instead, the marketplace measures the reward secured by a patented
invention. An important invention, for which there are few alternatives, will
command a high price if the inventor is the only seller. If others wish to make
or sell the invention, and the inventor for efficiency's sake finds it desirable to
let them, the price of a license will be correspondingly high. If, on the other
hand, the advancement is a minor one - one for which there are ready
substitutes, or which can be dispensed with entirely - the rewards will be
correspondingly small. Because the incentives are directed where the
advancements are, from the perspective of the marketplace, most significant,
the system seems well-calculated to promote the progress of technology, and in
a relatively efficient manner.
On the other hand, Americans have long mistrusted monopolies, however
justified. This instinctive hostility led even Thomas Jefferson, the man most
closely associated with the founding of the United States patent system, to
question whether monopolies should be tolerated under any circumstances.
16
As economists studying the field of antitrust well know, if one firm is the sole
supplier of a product for which there is no easy substitute, that firm will
maximize its profits by producing less of the product than would be produced
in a competitive marketplace while charging a higher price. 17 This not only
reduces consumer surplus - the difference between the benefit that a product
confers on consumers and the price they have to pay - it also generates
"deadweight loss." Deadweight loss occurs when some consumers who desire
the product, and who could pay the costs of its production, have to forego
purchasing the product at the monopolist's higher price. 18  Allocative
inefficiency results as society's resources are misdirected toward less desired
alternatives. 19 Assuming that a patented invention is one that does matter in
the marketplace, (i.e., it is a product for which there is unique consumer
demand), these unfortunate effects will occur. Hence a successful patent
system is one in which the public benefit created by encouraging technological
advancement more than compensates for the price paid as a consequence of the
patentee's monopoly.
20
16 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (detailing Jefferson's reservations
regarding the monopolies granted under the patent system).
17 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 12 (2d ed. 2001) ("[W]e now know that
output is smaller under monopoly than under competition."); see also HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 1.2(a) (3d ed. 2005) ("[Tlhe monopolist, unlike
the competitor, can obtain a higher price per unit of output by producing less.").
'8 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, §§ 1.1, 1.3(b).
'9 See id. § 2.3(c).
20 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REv. 989, 996-97 (1997) (discussing the costs and benefits associated with a patent
2007]
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A. The "Flash of Genius"
One way of adjusting the balance is by ensuring that patents are awarded
only to inventions of a certain quality - advancements, in Jefferson's phrase,
"worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent."'2' Patents for
some trivial inventions could be ignored in the marketplace with no harm done,
but serious consequences would ensue if, for example, a patent were granted
on an important product already invented by someone else. The patentee, in
that case, would take from the public while giving nothing in return. The
patent laws guard against this by denying patents to inventions that lack
novelty in comparison to various forms of "prior art" - including earlier
inventions in physical form and the disclosures of prior patents and
publications. 22 Yet to require that a patented invention be new is not quite
enough; if a patent claims something that differs from the prior art in an
insignificant way, the public will be limited in its freedoms, and deprived of its
funds, with little if any technological advancement to justify it. Suppose that
someone, observing the success of 3M's yellow Post-It Notes, had patented the
same item in a shade of blue. Even if neither 3M nor anyone else had yet
marketed a blue Post-It Note, it would be difficult to show how society
benefited by allowing the latecomer to comer whatever market there might be
for blue Post-It Notes. If such patents were allowed, successful products
would soon be surrounded by a thicket of opportunistic monopolies, claiming
the equivalent of pink Post-It Notes, square Post-It Notes, recycled-paper Post-
It Notes, and so forth.
Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, the level of advancement necessary to secure a
patent had been expressed by the courts in various terms, all grounded in the
necessity that a patent secure rights to an "invention. ' 23 The leading case of
the nineteenth century is Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,24 where the patentee
claimed a clay or porcelain door knob secured in a certain fashion to a screw.
25
Similar knobs, made of metal or wood, were already well-known; the only
thing that distinguished the patentee's version was the substitution of a
different material. 26 Although this might produce a better or cheaper knob, it
failed to rise to the level of a patentable invention: "The difference is formal,
and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment
system). For a discussion of attempts to explain the patent system through economic theory,
see infra Part III.D.
21 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
22 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (listing the varieties of relevant prior art).
23 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 14 (explaining that prior to the Patent Act, the term
"invention" was used).
24 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
25 Id. at 248-49 ("They have invented a new and useful improvement in making door and
other knobs, of all kinds of clay used in pottery, and of porcelain, which they state has not
been known or used before their application.").
26 Id. at 265.
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and skill in the selection and adaptation of materials ... but nothing more. 27
A true "invention" requires more "ingenuity and skill" than that possessed by
"an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business. '28 The work of even a
"skilful mechanic" is "not that of [an] inventor, '29 and cannot be the subject of
a patent.
The Hotchkiss standard of "invention" persisted, and in 1941, in Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,30 the Supreme Court used it to
invalidate a patent to an automobile cigarette lighter.31 The lighter included a
thennostat to interrupt the electrical circuit automatically when the heating
element reached the necessary temperature.3 2 Such controls had been used
before - in toasters and the like - but never in this context.33 The court did not
deny that the inventor had produced "a more efficient, useful, and convenient
article, 34 but the ingenuity required to adapt a well-known thermostat to a new
use was only "that to be expected of a mechanic skilled in the art." 35 In order
to qualify as an "invention" under the patent laws, a new device, the court held,
"must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling. '36
This reference to "creative genius" is the rhetorical high point in the
Supreme Court's campaign for a demanding test of inventiveness, without
which patentees might lay "the heavy hand of tribute ... on each slight
technological advance in an art." 37 Quoting the stirring words of Justice
Bradley in Atlantic Works v. Brady,38 the Court portrayed the consequences of
a system that grants patents too freely:
Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to
obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative
schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of
improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies,
which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country,
without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It
embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions
27 Id. at 266.
28 Id. at 267.
29 Id.
30 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
31 Id. at 88.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 88-89.
34 Id. at 91.
35 Id. at 91-92.
36 Id. at 91.
31 Id. at 92.
38 107 U.S. 192 (1882).
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of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious
accountings for profits made in good faith.
39
The court was undoubtedly correct that the encouragement of inventive
activity depends upon a judicious balancing of incentives. Monopoly
privileges cannot be granted indiscriminately. But in evoking the romantic
idea of "genius" - transmitted in a promethean "flash" no less - the Court may
have raised the bar of patentability too high. Some worthy inventions are the
products of patience and industry, not the kind of super-human insight
suggested by "genius.
'40
B. The Modern Standard ofNonobviousness
In the 1952 Patent Act, Congress, for the first time, attempted to define by
statute the level of ingenuity necessary to justify a patent. Reflecting the
Supreme Court precedent, a patentable invention must still surpass the skills
that are common in the art.4 1 Now, though, the yardstick is nonobviousness.
Section 103 states that a patent cannot be obtained:
[I]f the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
42
The "ordinary skilled mechanic," now re-christened the "person having
ordinary skill in the art," has been described as a bit of a plodder - someone
"who thinks along the line of conventional wisdom" and who does not seek to
innovate. 43 Advancements already obvious to such persons do not exhibit the
level of ingenuity necessary to support a patent. On the other hand, meeting
the standard of nonobviousness does not always require a "flash of creative
genius." Non-obvious insights produced through laborious investigation, or
even by accident, are no less qualified to receive a patent. 44 This is the
principle expressed in the first sentence of § 103(c), which states that
19 Cuno, 314 U.S. at 92 (quoting Atlanta Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883)
(Bradley, J., dissenting)).
40 See In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Most technological
advance is the fruit of methodical, persistent investigation.").
41 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) ("Patentability is to depend...
upon the 'non-obvious' nature of the 'subject matter sought to be patented' to a person
having ordinary skill in the pertinent art." (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000))).
42 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Although the Supreme Court viewed the standard of
patentability as unchanged, see Graham, 383 U.S. at 4, the terminology nonetheless marked
a departure from Hotchkiss and its progeny. Congress also sought to undo the effect of "the
controversial phrase 'flash of creative genius."' Id. at 15.
41 Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
44 See Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("[T]he path that leads an inventor to the invention is ... irrelevant to patentability.").
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"[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made."
'45
The perspective of the person of ordinary skill has become as central to
patent law as that of the reasonable person in tort law. Whether a patent
satisfies the disclosure requirements of § 112, including enablement46 and best
mode,47 is judged from the perspective of persons skilled in the art.48 Patent
claim language is interpreted from the same perspective,4 9 and claims may be
held indefinite 5° if they cannot be understood by persons of ordinary skill.5'
Finally, as we will see, the perspective of the person of ordinary skill plays a
role in determining what infringes a patent through equivalence.
52
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 5 3 the Supreme Court explained the process to
be followed in deciding whether an invention meets the standard of
nonobviousness.5 4 One must determine "the scope and content of the prior
art," the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue," and "the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art."' 55 With these facts in hand, one
decides if the differences, and the level of ordinary skill, are such that the
person of ordinary skill would have found the differences obvious or
nonobvious at the time the invention was made. 56 The ultimate decision still
seems conclusory; there is no breaking it down into simpler components. But
11 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000).
46 The patent specification must "enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains... to make and use [the invention]." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
17 The patent specification "shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention." Id.
48 See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (clarifying that a specification must enable persons skilled in the art to make and use
the invention without undue experimentation); Bayer A.G. v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d
1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the best mode is adequately disclosed if
persons skilled in the art, reviewing the specification, can identify the best mode and
practice it for themselves).
" Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("[W]e must always be conscious that our objective is to interpret the claims from the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art .... ).
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.").
51 See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("A
patent is invalid only when those skilled in the art are required to engage in undue
experimentation to practice the invention.").
52 See infra text accompanying notes 224-228.
11 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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the decision-maker may be aided, in appropriate cases, by certain "secondary
considerations" of a more objective character. These include "commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc. '57 The Court
admitted that there would be "difficulties" in applying the test of
nonobviousness, and that lack of uniformity might occur. The difficulties,
however, would be no worse than those encountered in other areas of the law -
such as negligence - where the uncertain perspective of a hypothetical person
decides important liability issues. 58
The most significant development in the obviousness inquiry after Graham
is the emphasis placed by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on those
"secondary considerations" which, the Supreme Court said, "may have
relevancy. '59 These considerations are not, in the view of the Federal Circuit,
optional or "icing on the cake" - they must be considered in every case where
they are present.60  Secondary considerations are important because they
promise a degree of objectivity and protection from the ever-present risk of
"hindsight. '61 An expanded list of secondary considerations 62 would include:
- Long-felt but unresolved need;
- Failure of others;
- Commercial success;
- Industry recognition;




Where the claimed invention solves a problem, long-felt need and the failure
of others are strong evidence of nonobviousness. Had the solution been
obvious to persons of ordinary skill, presumably they would have produced it
57 Id. at 17-18.
18 Id. at 18 ("The difficulties.., are comparable to those encountered daily.., in
negligence.., and should be amenable to a case-by-case development.").
59 Id.
60 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see also Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
61 Crown Operations Int'l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Good
ideas may well appear 'obvious' after they have been disclosed, despite having been
previously unrecognized.").
62 Those considerations specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court in Graham may
carry greater weight than others, admitted through the open door of the "etc." See
Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The factors




already, addressing the need and avoiding the failure. 63 Commercial success
suggests the same thing, in a more roundabout way. If the commercial success
of a product within the scope of the patent is due to the unique way in which
the claimed invention satisfies a need, the failure of others to reap the profits
may indicate that the invention eluded their comprehension. In other words, if
a profitable mousetrap had been obvious, someone else would have sold it
already.64 Industry recognition and expressions of disbelief provide direct
evidence that persons skilled in the art were impressed with the invention. The
recognition may come in the form of licensing,65 or, in a backhanded way,
through copying the patented invention.66 Candid expressions of skepticism or
disbelief, even more than statements praising the invention, may serve as
compelling evidence of nonobviousness.67 The one secondary consideration
on the list that may indicate obviousness, rather than nonobviousness, 68 is near-
simultaneous invention. If others skilled in the art, working independently of
the patentee, produced the same invention at about the same time (even if too
late to serve as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102), this may indicate that the art
63 See In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Recognition of need,
and difficulties encountered by those skilled in the field, are classical indicia of
nonobviousness.").
64 See Dickey-John Corp. v. Int'l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 346-47 (7th Cir.
1983). Although commercial success is a common secondary consideration, the logic of it
requires careful handling of the evidence. It must be determined, for example, whether the
success of the product is due to the claimed invention or to other factors, such as promotion,
marketing, or unrelated design advantages. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip
Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that commercial success is
relevant to nonobviousness where there is a "nexus" between that success and the claimed
invention).
65 In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Licenses taken under the
patent in suit may constitute evidence of nonobviousness.").
66 See Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285-86 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
67 See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1380 (treating positive recognition as indicative of
nonobviousness); Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GMBH, 139 F.3d 877,
885 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (remarking that general skepticism from those in the art is relevant as
to nonobviousness); Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 919 F.2d 720, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(treating skepticism toward a patentee's "new-fangled approach" as objective evidence of
nonobviousness). One form of expressing skepticism is "teaching away," or advocating an
approach to a problem contrary to that adopted by the patentee. Monarch Knitting, 139 F.3d
at 885.
68 The absence of the preceding secondary considerations, according to the Federal
Circuit, is not evidence of obviousness but a "neutral factor." See Medtronic, Inc. v.
Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1986) cited with approval in Gentry
Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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had advanced to the point where the invention had become inevitable, and
indeed obvious even to persons of ordinary skill.
69
C. The Doctrine of Equivalents
If the invention is nonobvious, and the other statutory requirements are met,
the inventor is eligible to receive a patent. The value of the patent depends, in
part, on its duration, generally a term of twenty years from the date the patent
application was filed.70 The value of a patent is equally a product of its
scope.71 If the rights conferred by a patent are so narrow that products beyond
its scope are easily produced and easily substituted in the marketplace, the
patent will be worth very little. If the rights are broad enough to encompass all
reasonable substitutes, and the invention is one for which there is a demand,
the patentee may reap substantial profits due to the absence of competition. A
broader patent translates into a more substantial reward for the patentee, but at
the expense of future inventors whose efforts are more likely to require the
patentee's permission. Hence, the desired result of encouraging innovation, by
one generation of inventors and the next, requires careful attention to the
breadth of the exclusive rights granted by a patent.
Originally, the scope of a patent was determined primarily by example; the
patentee described a working embodiment of the invention, and the patent
encompassed other embodiments that were essentially the same. Patentees
might assist the future fact finder by expressing, in "claims," a few salient
points as to what it was that the patentee regarded as essential to the
invention. 72 After the 1870 Patent Act, requiring patentees to "distinctly
claim" the invention, the claim language gradually took on a new
significance. 73 The former system of "central claiming" - dominated by the
disclosure of the preferred embodiments - yielded to the current system of
"peripheral claiming," where the claim language, like a deed, attempts to
define the outer limits, the "metes and bounds," of the patentee's exclusive
69 See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1379; In re Merk & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1098 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
70 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
71 See Cotropia, supra note 9, at 172 ("The breadth of the patent's scope.., can prevent
an early expiration."). As Cotropia points out, a patent claim of narrower scope is
equivalent to a patent claim with a shorter term, because the substitution of non-patented
products, resulting in the effective abolition of the patentee's monopoly, is likely to occur
sooner. Id.
72 See Cianfrani, supra note 7, at 13. Judge Newman outlines the history of claiming in
her "commentary," appended to the Federal Circuit's en banc opinion in Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 957-59 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). The earliest form
of claims often used phrases such as "substantially as described." See DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.02[l] (2007).
73 Patent Act of 1870 § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
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rights.74 This accounts for the usually complex, technical, and legalistic claim
language found at the conclusion of every patent. Patentees still must provide,
in the patent specification, a detailed description of their preferred
embodiments. This serves, in part, as satisfaction of the patentee's duty to
enrich the knowledge of those skilled in the art with an enabling disclosure of
the patentee's invention.75 It also assists in understanding the meaning of the
claim language. 76 But it is the claims, not the preferred embodiments, that
determine what does or does not infringe the patent.77  A patent claim
resembles a checklist, describing all of the elements that, in combination,
comprise the patented invention. If an accused product or process includes
everything the claim describes, that claim is literally infringed.
78
Because competitors of the patentee rely on the claims to tell them what
they may or may not do, the modem Patent Act requires that claim language be
definite.79 However, no language, not even the most carefully constructed
claim language, can ever be entirely free of ambiguity. Hence patentees are
not required to describe their inventions with "mathematical precision"; 80 the
requirement of definiteness is satisfied if the claims "reasonably apprise those
skilled in the art of [the] scope of the invention, and ... the language is as
precise as the subject matter permits."' 81  "Words of degree," such as
"substantialiy" and "approximate," are common in patent claims. 82 Yet there
are occasions when claim language is sufficiently clear that competitors of the
patentee can "design around" it, confident that what they are doing does not
7 See S3 Inc. v. nVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
7 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
76 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
77 Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
78 DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also
Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Suntiger, Inc. v.
Scientific Research Funding Group, 189 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (indicating that
unless the claim is specifically crafted to exclude them, the presence of additional elements
in the accused product has no bearing on infringement).
79 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (stating that claims must "particularly point out and distinctly
claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention"); All Dental Prodx,
LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The primary
purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that the claims are written in such a way
that they give notice to the public .. so that interested [persons] can determine whether or
not they infringe.").
80 Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[A]
patentee need not define his invention with mathematical precision in order to comply with
the definiteness requirement."); see also Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
359 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (terms subject to different interpretations are not
necessarily indefinite).
8' Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
82 See Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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literally infringe.83 That competitors cannot be equally confident in their
freedom from liability is due to the long-established "doctrine of equivalents."
1. Winans v. Denmead
One of the earliest manifestations of the doctrine of equivalents is found in
the 1854 Supreme Court case Winans v. Denmead.8 4 The patent claimed a
railroad car shaped, in part, like the "frustum of a cone," and suitable for
transporting coal and similar materials. 85 The shape distributed the weight of
the cargo in such a way that a car of relatively light construction could carry a
heavy load without damage.86 The accused infringer's railroad car was not
circular in cross-section, as a cone would be, but octagonal.8 7 Nevertheless,
the shape was close enough to conical that similar benefits were obtained. 88
Reflecting the spirit of central claiming, the Court dismissed the importance of
the "change of form":
The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at
liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions.
And, therefore, the patentee, having described his invention, and shown
its principles, and claimed it in that form which most perfectly embodies
it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to claim every form in which his
invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim
some of those forms.
89
The defendant would infringe if, in the opinion of the jury, the octagonal
design was close enough to circular as "to embody the patentee's mode of
operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached by his
invention." 90 The result might not be "precisely the same in degree," but if
"the same in kind, and effected by the employment of [the same] mode of
operation in substance," the defendant could be found liable. 91  Justice
Campbell, dissenting, decried the uncertainty introduced by ignoring the
express language of the patent.
92
83 See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called 'negative incentive' to 'design
around' a competitor's products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow
of innovations to the marketplace.").
84 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 332 (1854).
85 Id. at 342.
86 Id. at 340.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 343.
90 Id. at 344.
91 Id.
92 Specifically, Justice Campbell wrote:
The claim of to-day is, that an octagonal car is an infringement of this patent. Will this
be the limit to that claim? Who can tell the bounds within which the mechanical
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2. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.
Nearly a century later, well into the era of peripheral claiming but shortly
before passage of the 1952 Patent Act, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
equivalence in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.
93
The patent claimed a welding flux combining calcium fluoride with an
"alkaline earth metal silicate. '94  The patentee's compound included
magnesium, an alkaline earth metal.95 The defendant's product used silicate of
manganese instead.96 Although magnesium and manganese sound similar, and
they perform similarly in this context, manganese is not an alkaline earth
metal, as the claim required. 97 The Court observed that "to permit imitation of
a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to
convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing."98
The "unscrupulous copyist," guided by the patent disclosure, could introduce
"unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions... which, though
adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim,
and hence outside the reach of law." 99  Thus, prohibiting only literal
infringement would "place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism" and would
"subordinat[e] substance to form."' 0 0 To avoid that result, the Court would
"'temper unsparing logic"' 10' by recognizing that equivalents of the claimed
invention also infringe.
The equivalency principle applies where the accused product 'performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result. '"10 2 Elaborating, the Court offered the following guidance for
determining when a product that does not literally infringe is still an equivalent
of the claimed invention:
What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of
the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case.
industry of the country may freely exert itself? What restraints does this patent impose
in this branch of the mechanic art? ... Nothing ... will be more mischievous, more
productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and
vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a relaxation of [the] wise and salutary
requisitions of the act of Congress [demanding that patentees describe their invention
with particularity].
Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
93 339 U.S. 605 (1950).




98 Id. at 607.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
102 Id.
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Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not
an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete
identity for every purpose and in every respect. In determining
equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other
and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may
sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose
for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when
combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is intended
to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in
the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was.
A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact. Proof can be
made in any form: through testimony of experts or others versed in the
technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of course,
by the disclosures of the prior art.
10 3
That the analysis is not the "prisoner of a formula" is perhaps an
understatement, but the majority had no difficulty in finding that manganese in
a welding flux is the equivalent of magnesium, whether or not it is an alkaline
earth metal. 10 4 The testimony of chemists and the disclosures of the prior art
established that manganese and magnesium react in similar ways, are found in
the same ores, and serve the same purpose in a welding flux.1 05 Earlier patents
taught the use of manganese in welding. 10 6 One expert even testified that
manganese might be considered an alkaline earth metal "'in the sense of the
patent," ' 10 7 suggesting an alternative argument in favor of literal infringement.
Specialists knew that manganese could be substituted for magnesium in the
patentee's composition, 10 8 and there was no evidence that the defendant had
developed its alternative through independent research, as opposed to
copying. 10 9 Echoing Justice Campbell's sentiments in Winans, however, was
Justice Black, whose dissent lamented the public's inability to rely on
unambiguous claim language.I 10
103 Id. at 609.
104 Id. at 612.
105 Id. at 610-11.
106 Id. at 611.
107 Id.
10' Id. at 612.
109 Id.
10 See id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Giving this patentee the benefit of a grant that it
did not precisely claim is no less 'unjust to the public' and no less an evasion of R.S. § 4888
merely because done in the name of the 'doctrine of equivalents."').
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3. Articulating a Standard
Although the Supreme Court abjured formulas, after Graver Tank, the
dominant test for determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
became the "triple identity" or "three-prong" test: Does the accused product or
process perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same way,
to achieve substantially the same result?"' Indeed, the Federal Circuit became
so enamored of the three-prong test that its application became almost
formulaic. Not only were plaintiffs required to satisfy the three-prong test,
they were required to offer separate proof, and linking arguments, to satisfy
each prong."12 The most objective consideration mentioned in Graver Tank -
whether the alleged equivalent was known to substitute for the thing literally
claimed- also remained important." 3 The Federal Circuit's most significant
refinement of the equivalence analysis came in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland, Inc.,' 14 where the court en banc held that each element of a patent
claim must find at least an equivalent in the accused product or process; a
general or overall similarity is insufficient.15
Because the Supreme Court in Graver Tank had stressed equitable
considerations, characterizing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
as tantamount to piracy," 6 critics of the doctrine were tempted to limit its
application to those situations where the defendant had indeed acted unfairly -
perhaps exempting the good-faith competitor who designed around the claim
language, or the defendant who, without knowledge of the patent, innocently
developed a similar product."i 7 In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 18 the Supreme Court rejected that argument and for the first
III Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
112 Id. at 1327; Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("In order to assure such separate analysis, we said in Nestier,... a jury must be
separately directed to the proof of each Graver Tank element."). Without a structured
analysis, it was said, juries would be "put to sea without guiding charts." Lear Siegler, 873
F.2d at 1426.
l13 Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Known interchangeability is an important factor in determining equivalence.").
114 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
..5 See id. at 935; see also Bell Atd. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'n Group, Inc.,
262 F.3d 1258, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]here can be no infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents if even one element of a claim or its equivalent is not present in the accused
device.").
116 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (referring
to "the unscrupulous copyist," "pirat[ing] an invention," and "fraud on a patent").
"I See Int'l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Lourie, J., concurring) (postulating that "independent research result[ing] in an invention or
product significantly different from what is claimed, albeit one that might perform
substantially the same function in the same way to obtain the same result" may not justify
the application of the doctrine of equivalents).
1"8 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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time in nearly fifty years reaffirmed the general contours of the doctrine of
equivalents. The patent in Warner-Jenkinson claimed a method of filtering
dye. 119 One of the claimed parameters was operation of the process at a pH
level "from approximately 6.0 to 9.0."120 The defendant's process operated at
a pH level of 5.0, which the patentee admitted fell outside the scope of literal
infringement. 12 The Court declined to limit the doctrine of equivalents to
instances of piracy, which would, in any case, be difficult to distinguish from
instances of designing around. 122 Regardless of the defendant's intent, the
Court maintained, there is still a fundamental identity between a claimed
invention and its equivalent that justifies a finding of infringement.
23
Independent research, or the lack of it, is relevant primarily for the light it
sheds on the factor of "known interchangeability."'
' 24
A remaining question was how to articulate the measure of equivalence.
25
The Court observed that the 'triple identity"' test, perhaps suitable for
mechanical combinations, "provides a poor framework for analyzing other
products or processes."' 2 6 On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test,
offered as an alternative, 27 provides "little additional guidance as to what
might render any given difference 'insubstantial." ' 128 In the end, the Court
declined to adopt any particular formula or framework, leaving that task to the
lower courts:
In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important
than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the
accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to
each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic
frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their
particular facts. A focus on individual elements and a special vigilance
119 Id.
120 Id. at 22.
121 Id. at 23.
122 Id. at 34-35 (stating that while "Graver Tank refers to the prevention of copying and
piracy when describing the benefits of the doctrine of equivalents," that "does not mean that
its application is limited only to cases where those particular benefits are obtained").
123 Id. at 35 (reasoning that "[i]f the essential predicate of the doctrine of equivalents is
the notion of identity," then there is no difference between "an infringing equivalent" and "a
device that infringes" literally, and there is no proof of intent requirement).
124 Id. at 36 ("The need for independent experimentation thus could reflect knowledge -
or lack thereof- of interchangeability possessed by one presumably skilled in the art.").
125 Id. at 39 ("All that remains is to address the debate regarding the linguistic framework
under which 'equivalence' is determined.").
126 Id. at 39-40.
127 See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(stating that an equivalent is "an insubstantial change which, from the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art, adds nothing of significance to the claimed invention").
128 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
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against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any
such elements should reduce considerably the imprecision of whatever
language is used. An analysis of the role played by each element in the
context of the specific patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to
whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the
claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role
substantially different from the claimed element. With these limiting
principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further and
micromanaging the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing
equivalence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the
formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-
case determinations, and we leave such refinement to that court's sound
judgment in this area of its special expertise. 2 9
Since that time, the Federal Circuit has made little progress in developing a
refined formulation of equivalence. If anything, its approach has become more
generalized than before. Although the Supreme Court had little to say in favor
of the insubstantial differences test, that test appears to have replaced the triple
identity test as the dominant linguistic framework. 130
4. Setting Limits
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court admitted that the doctrine of equivalents
could go too far, "tak[ing] on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent
claims."' 31 "[A]pplied broadly, [the doctrine] conflicts with the definitional
and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."' 132 In order
to prevent this conflict, courts limit the scope of equivalence in various ways.
One way, endorsed by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson, is to demand
that each and every element of the patent claim be matched by an identical or
equivalent element in the accused product. 133 In addition, the patentee may
surrender potential equivalents if they are disclosed in the patent but omitted
from the subject matter explicitly claimed. Competitors of the patentee, seeing
such alternatives disclosed but not claimed, may consider them "dedicated to
the public."'1 34 Another limitation is found in the prior art. Equivalence cannot
129 Id.
130 Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 266 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("To
determine whether the accused device includes equivalents for a claim limitation, this court
applies the 'insubstantial differences' test."); cf id. ("In appropriate cases the function-way-
result test offers additional guidance on the question of equivalence.").
131 520 U.S. at 28-29.
132 Id. at 29.
133 Id. ("It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an
individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in
its entirety.").
131 See Johnson & Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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expand the scope of the claim so much that it encompasses the prior art as well
as the accused product.1 35 One way to approach this issue is to ask if the
Patent Office could have issued a claim broad enough to have been literally
infringed, or whether such a claim would have been rejected as obvious or
anticipated. 136
One of the most important limitations on equivalents is the doctrine of
"prosecution history estoppel." If the patentee surrendered certain subject
matter in order to successfully prosecute the patent application, the patentee is
estopped from recapturing that same subject matter by asserting equivalence in
a subsequent lawsuit. 137 Anything less would contradict the public record,
1 38
and it would allow applicants to evade Patent Office scrutiny of their more
ambitious claims. 1
39
In 2000, the Federal Circuit surprised the Patent Bar by adopting, in an en
banc decision, a less flexible interpretation of prosecution history estoppel than
most of the precedent had suggested. 140 In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,141 the majority ruled that if a claim element is narrowed
during prosecution for any reason related to patentability, the patentee is barred
subsequently from asserting any range of equivalents for that element, even if
not closely related to what the patentee had relinquished. 142 On appeal,
143
"I Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("It is well settled law that a patentee cannot assert a range of equivalents that
encompasses the prior art.").
136 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents,
coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims.").
137 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("'The essence
of prosecution history estoppel is that a patentee should not be able to obtain, through the
doctrine of equivalents, coverage of subject matter that was relinquished during prosecution
to procure issuance of that patent."' (quoting Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d
948, 951-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
138 See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Other
players in the marketplace are entitled to rely on the record made in the Patent Office in
determining the meaning and scope of the patent.").
131 See Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("[A]void[ing] the possibility of an applicant obtaining in court a scope of protection which
encompasses subject matter that, through the conscious efforts of the applicant, the PTO did
not examine.").
140 See, e.g., Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 703
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("'Depending on the nature and purpose of an amendment it may have a
limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero."' (quoting Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
141 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
142 Id. at 574 ("[P]rosecution history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the application of
the doctrine of equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the scope of a claim for a
reason related to patentability.").
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however, the Supreme Court reinstated a more flexible approach to estoppel
and, more importantly for our purposes, offered its most recent thoughts on the
nature and objective of the doctrine of equivalents. 1
44
The Court observed that, like the boundaries of any property, the boundaries
of the patent monopoly should be clear; "[a] patent holder should know what
he owns, and the public should know what he does not."' 145 Clarity is
"essential" to the progress of technology because it "enables efficient
investment in innovation." 146  "If competitors cannot be certain about a
patent's extent, they may be deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures
outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in competing products that the
patent secures."' 147 The problem lies in the nature of language - an inadequacy
that makes it impossible to "capture the essence of a thing in a patent
application."'' 48 Because language may fail to mirror every nuance of the
invention or "describe with complete precision the range of its novelty," the
courts have preserved the value of patents, even at the cost of uncertainty, by
proscribing "[u]nimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain
elements."' 49 Whether prosecution history estoppel comes into play depends,
ultimately, on whether the shortcomings of descriptive language still explain
the need to resort to equivalence, or whether the applicant had the words
necessary to describe the invention more broadly but chose not to use them in
order to ensure that the patent would issue.
150
5. "Substantial" Problems
Arguments against the doctrine of equivalents are as old as the doctrine
itself. In brief, infringement by equivalence subverts the notice function of the
claims, required by statute to describe the invention "distinctly," and it short-
1 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
'" Id. at 738 ("While this Court has not weighed the merits of the complete bar against
the flexible bar in its prior cases, we have consistently applied the doctrine in a flexible way,
not a rigid one.").
145 Id. at 731; see also Cianfrani, supra note 7, at 29.
146 Festo, 535 U.S. at 730-3 1.
117 Id. at 732; see also Cianfrani, supra note 7, at 21 (referring to the "chilling effect" on
modifications that are beyond the reach of the patent, but not so far out of reach as to make a
potential improver certain of prevailing in a dispute). "In addition the uncertainty may lead
to wasteful litigation between competitors, suits that a rule of literalism might avoid."
Festo, 535 U.S. at 732.
148 Festo, 535 U.S. at 731; see also id. at 734 ("The doctrine of equivalents is premised
on language's inability to capture the essence of innovation ... .
149 Id. at 731.
150 "The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art
could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent." Id. at 741. This might be accomplished by
demonstrating that the equivalent was unforeseeable, or that the rationale for the narrowing
amendment bore only "a tangential relation to the equivalent in question." Id.
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circuits the process by which the patentee's monopoly must be approved, in
advance, through expert examination at the Patent Office. The Supreme Court
has consistently held these trade-offs acceptable, and necessary, to preserve the
value of patents, without which innovation would be insufficiently rewarded.
Congress has shown no inclination to intervene. Yet it is difficult to regard the
matter of equivalence as settled when the test to be applied in every case is so
inadequately described.
Many standards applied in law are succinct in form and subjective in
application. Negligence, for example, can be described to a jury as a failure to
act as a reasonable person would under the circumstances. Equivalence can
be, and has been, compared to these other hard questions. In Warner-
Jenkinson, for example, the Court remarked that "[m]uch as the perspective of
the hypothetical 'reasonable person' gives content to concepts such as
'negligent' behavior, the perspective of a skilled practitioner provides content
to, and limits on, the concept of 'equivalence.'ll 51 But is that actually the
case?
Jurors contemplating negligence have a mental yardstick to apply, however
imperfect it may be. Jurors can imagine themselves in the circumstances of the
defendant, can imagine (if necessary) that they have the foresight and wisdom
of a "reasonable person," and can further imagine their likely reaction to the
circumstances of an accident. Would they have slammed on the brakes, or
tried to cross the drawbridge before it opened? Jurors asked to judge
equivalence, 152 however, face a different kind of challenge. They are provided
with a multitude of facts, including all the ways in which a claim element and
an alleged equivalent are similar, and different. They will always be similar in
some ways, or there would be no equivalence argument at all, and different in
others, or there would be literal infringement. Jurors may be told everything
that persons skilled in the art knew about the subject, including whether A was
known to substitute for B. All of this, however, is data; it does not decide the
question. What matters is whether the differences are substantial. What it
takes to be "substantial" is not just obscure, it is undefined. It is not only that
jurors must imagine themselves in a more challenging role - the role of a
person skilled in a technical subject matter. Even if the jurors can assume the
personality and adopt the wisdom of the person of ordinary skill, assuming
such wisdom still brings them no closer to understanding what "substantial"
means. In contrast to the reasonable person standard, there is no mental
reaction, real or imaginary, that jurors can use to measure substantiality. 
153
1' Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
152 Although claim interpretation is a question of law for the court, equivalence is a
question of fact for a jury. Id. at 38-39.
"I One can imagine a dialogue between an uncertain juror and a judge versed in patent
law: "Q: How large a difference is a 'substantial' difference? A: Large enough for you to




The triple identity test offers only the illusion of greater substance. It
requires the fact finder to consider three issues - function, way, and result.
1 54
Inevitably, the alleged equivalent performs generally (if not precisely) the
same function as the claim element, and achieves generally (if not precisely)
the same result. What is most likely to differ is the "way" the result is
achieved. 55  One can heat a cup of water on an electric stove or in a
microwave oven. The stove and the oven perform the same function and
achieve the same result (or a similar result, if speed is a consideration). They
operate, though, in different ways - the stove heating by resistance and
conduction; the microwave oven by radio waves, which cause the water
molecules to jostle in a fluctuating magnetic field. If heating the water were
part of a patented process, a juror might be asked to determine whether the
stove and the oven performed substantially the same function, in substantially
the same way, to achieve substantially the same result. Again, substantiality is
the threshold. Let us suppose that the juror finds functions and results
indistinguishable, but is unsure about the "way" - undoubtedly different, but
perhaps substantially the same. Both stove and oven heat the water by
electricity, so in some ways they are more alike than a gas stove would be to
either. Electric stoves and microwave ovens are easily substituted - something
even casual chefs know. But physicists would testify that microwave ovens
and electric stoves operate in fundamentally different "ways." How could a
conscientious juror, guided only by the term "substantially," reach a principled
decision?
The substantial differences test has achieved no greater refinement because
it is, essentially, a dead end. One might as well invite fact finders to hold an
equivalent equivalent if it is equivalent. The Supreme Court did almost that by
rejecting any particular "linguistic framework" in favor of the "essential
inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?"' 156 But with so
little guidance, fact finders may, in effect, invent their own rules.
If one were searching for a measure of similarity that does mean something,
one would find it close at hand in the concept of obviousness. Obviousness
depends upon the mental state of a hypothetical person under hypothetical
circumstances - not an easy thing to determine, but comparable to the
"reasonable person" standard. In contrast to decisions based on substantiality,
an obviousness determination has, at least theoretically, a right answer and a
wrong answer, mirroring discoverable realities in the world outside of the
courtroom. Objective factors like known interchangeability are connected to
154 "Function" and "result" are difficult to distinguish, so long as the function of an
element in a combination is to achieve a particular result.
"I See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("In the present case, as often happens in doctrine of equivalents cases, there is no material
dispute about the 'function' and the 'result' prongs of the test.").
156 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
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obviousness in a way they are not connected to abstract substantiality, and
additional objective considerations - like commercial success - could assist the
decision maker. Accordingly, even the "ordinary skilled mechanic" of patent
doctrine, frustrated with the current test of equivalence, might propose a
symmetrical approach: if the claimed invention is obvious compared to the
prior art, it is invalid; if the accused product is obvious compared to the
claimed invention, it infringes. Unfortunately, this simple approach has
serious problems of its own.
II. WHY SYMMETRY IS NOT SIMPLE
A rule of thumb known to every student of patent law is that whatever
literally infringes a patent if it comes later in time, anticipates if it came
before. 157 In other words, if a product introduced after the patentee's invention
would literally infringe - by including each and every element of the claim,
exactly as described - the same product, if it were discovered in the prior art,
would anticipate the claim and render it invalid for lack of novelty. One is
tempted to extend the symmetry by saying that a product close enough to have
rendered the claimed invention obvious if it came before is close enough to
infringe by equivalence if it came later. However, the pairing of obviousness
and equivalence does not work out as neatly as the pairing of anticipation and
literal infringement, for at least two reasons. One is the problem of tying the
conclusion of obviousness to the patentee's invention. The other is the
problem of accounting for the time-dependent nature of obviousness.
A. Tying Obviousness to the Patentee's Invention




- a latch to release said spring when a mouse
disturbs said trigger; and
- means, activated by the release of said spring,
to capture the mouse.
A patent claim is a not a description of one thing, but a description of a class
of things, all of which embody the "invention." To focus on one element only,
the spring might be described in the patent specification as a two-inch length of
tightly-wound steel, but the claim would be literally infringed by any
mousetrap that included a spring of any kind, together with the other claim
elements. Hence, the claim encompasses traps with large springs, small
springs, plastic springs, and so forth. At the same time, any single prior art
157 Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("[Tihat which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier than the date of
invention." (quoting Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc. 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988))).
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mousetrap within the class described by the claim, whether it had the same
kind of spring or a different kind, would be sufficient to anticipate the claim. 
58
In this respect, literal infringement and anticipation are symmetrical.
Obviousness is more subtle; it may be based on one prior art reference, or
the combination of several. 59  The question is whether, at the time the
invention was made, the differences between the prior art and the claimed
invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. If the prior
art included a mousetrap with all of the claim elements but a rubber band in
place of a spring, one would ask whether the substitution of a spring would
have been obvious. Although it is seldom put in these terms, it would be
logical and consistent to say that if any mousetrap within the class of
mousetraps encompassed by the claim would have been obvious, the claim
should be rejected. If there were several mousetraps in the prior art that alone
or in combination would have rendered the claimed invention obvious, there
would be no need to choose among them. A once-popular image was that of a
person of ordinary skill standing in his workshop surrounded by a "tableau" of
all of the relevant prior art.160 If any of the collective wisdom represented in
that tableau rendered the invention obvious, the patent claim would be rejected.
Now suppose it was the accused mousetrap that, having all of the other
claim elements, substituted a rubber band for the spring. Further suppose that
"spring" cannot be interpreted to include rubber bands, so the claim is not
literally infringed. In a symmetrical system, one would ask whether the
accused mousetrap infringed as an equivalent because it was obvious. But
obvious compared to what?
In discussing infringement, the place to start is the claim, even when the
issue is one of infringement by equivalence. An obviousness analysis, on the
other hand, logically begins with a disclosure of information - a foundation for
further advancements. A person skilled in the art might read a technical
bulletin, or examine a product, and could, based on what is disclosed there, in
combination with other knowledge, conclude that further improvements or
variations were obvious. A claim also has some value as a disclosure - claims
are, strictly speaking, a part of the patent specification, 16 whose function is to
158 See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[I]f
granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow the patentee to exclude the
public from practicing the prior art, then that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it
also covers subject matter not in the prior art.").
159 If obviousness is based on a combination of references, there must have been in the
prior art a suggestion or motivation to effect the combination. Boehringer Ingelheim
Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
160 See Para-Ordnance Mfg. v. SGS Imps. Int'l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Put another way, would one of ordinary skill in the art who set out to solve the problem of
increasing ammunition capacity, and who had before him in his workshop the prior art, have
been reasonably expected to use the solution that is claimed in the ... patent.").
161 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
("[C]laims 'must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part."' (quoting
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educate - but a claim serves primarily as a legal definition of the scope of the
patent. A person skilled in the art looking for a technical understanding of the
invention - a disclosure of information - would normally turn to the
description of the preferred embodiments. It would be more meaningful,
therefore, to examine the substitution of a rubber band for the spring in the
context of the preferred embodiments, where the detailed disclosure might
reveal that a rubber band is, or is not, an obvious substitution.
One could, therefore, simply compare the patentee's preferred embodiment
to the accused device to see if the differences were obvious. This would
revive, in a rather stark way, the model of "central claiming." Here, we would
face serious difficulties, not the least of which is more than a century of
jurisprudence emphasizing the primacy of the claim language. The Patent
Office defines the invention by the claim language. Preferred embodiments
include many details recited to satisfy the patentee's disclosure requirements,
but unnecessary to distinguish the patentee's invention. If the infringement
inquiry focused only on the preferred embodiments, these irrelevant details
might have a decisive effect.
Similarly, if one were only comparing the accused product to the preferred
embodiments, one might find aspects of the accused product that made it, in a
general sense, nonobvious, but which did not prevent it from falling within the
scope of the patentee's invention. To return to the example, suppose that the
patentee's preferred embodiment includes a steel spring and a bell (unclaimed)
to signal that a mouse has been captured. The accused product includes a
rubber band, and an electric buzzer to signal success. If a person skilled in the
art were comparing the two mousetrap designs, the obviousness inquiry might
turn to the difference between a bell and a buzzer, which has nothing to do
with the combination claimed as an invention. In some way, any infringement
determination, even one using a standard of obviousness, has to be grounded in
the claims.
Another concern, if obviousness were in fact the standard for infringement,
would be one of (to coin a term) "connectedness." If a claim is obvious in
comparison to the prior art, it is immaterial whether it is one piece of prior art
or another that made it so. In an infringement inquiry, it would be necessary to
link the obviousness of the accused product to the patentee's invention. A
person skilled in the art might consider the accused mousetrap and find it
obvious even if the patentee had never entered the picture. Imagine, for
example, that what had set the patentee's mousetrap apart from the prior art
was the inclusion of a spring. Other mousetrap designs, and rubber bands used
in those designs or elsewhere, might be enough, without any reference to the
patent, to make the accused mousetrap an obvious design. But it would be no
more logical to conclude that the mousetrap infringed the patent just because
the mousetrap was obvious than it would be to conclude that a bicycle, for
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), af'd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996))).
[Vol. 87:969
PATENT SYMMETRY
example, infringed the patent because the bicycle was obvious. The problem
may not be as bad as it seems, because if the prior art made the accused
product obvious, other principles prevent the scope of equivalence from
reaching so far. 162 But in some cases, the art that made the accused product
obvious might have come after the patent. Consequently, the inquiry must
somehow connect the patentee's invention to the condition of obviousness.
These problems are not insurmountable, and the solution seems to lie in the
general approach already used to determine equivalence. Today the claim is
the basis of comparison, and each element of the claim must find a counterpart
in the accused product. 63 Whether the counterpart is equivalent is judged in
light of the teachings of the entire patent. A similar approach could be used if
obviousness were the measure of equivalence. Reverting to the mousetrap
example, one could ask whether it would be obvious to substitute a rubber
band for the spring specified in the claim, in light of the teachings of the patent
and the general knowledge of one skilled in the art. The information disclosed
in the specification would play a significant role, but the claim would limit the
inquiry and tie it specifically to the invention, as the invention was represented
to the Patent Office. "Connectedness" would also be much less of an issue.
There could be obvious/infringing mousetraps that were developed without any
knowledge, or even possible knowledge, of the patentee's work, but
infringement has never depended on knowledge of the patent, 164 nor, for that
matter, has obviousness ever depended on the inventor's actual knowledge of
the prior art. 165 The connectedness issue is about making sure that the accused
product is so related to the claim that it falls within the broader penumbra that
162 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining that equivalence cannot
expand the scope of the claim so much that it encompasses the prior art as well as the
accused product).
163 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (stating that each element of a patent
claim must find at least an equivalent in the accused product or process).
164 See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that
infringement "is a strict liability offense").
165 Most prior art references are theoretically available to anyone of skill in the art
exercising ordinary diligence. See Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d
135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The statutory language, 'known or used by others in this
country,' means knowledge or use which is accessible to the public."). On occasion,
however, the reference is extremely obscure. See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445
F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (describing figures deleted from a Canadian patent, but
present in the patent's prosecution file, as "publicly accessible"). Also, a patent may be held
invalid if obvious in comparison to a patent application that was not accessible to the public
at the time the invention was made. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ("A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless ... the invention was described in ... an application for patent, published
under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the
applicant for patent .... ); Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1402
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that "secret prior art" under section 102(e) will become public
eventually).
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might be characterized as the invention. The element-by-element approach,
and the idea of substitution, seems sufficient to eliminate the case of infringing




Obviousness, as a matter of patent validity, is judged from the perspective of
"the time the invention was made,' 167 meaning the time when the invention
was conceived and reduced to practice by the patentee, either by constructing a
working prototype1 68 or by filing a patent application with an enabling
disclosure. 169 As any technological art progresses, the knowledge possessed
by those of ordinary skill increases and more things become obvious. The
patentee is not penalized by this; validity is a matter of what the patentee
contributed to the advancement of the art at the time the contribution was
made. It is particularly necessary to avoid hindsight in judging the significance
of that contribution.
If an obviousness standard were used to determine equivalence, the temporal
perspective would be critical. The most symmetrical option would be to adopt,
as in the case of validity, the perspective of the time when the invention was
made. A second option would be to consider the time when the patent
application was filed, which would more closely follow the literal infringement
inquiry. 170 This perspective ensures that the courts and the Patent Office
construe the claims in the same manner. A final option, and the one that seems
most consistent with current practice, would be to judge the
obviousness/equivalence of the accused product at the time of the alleged
infringement. 171 All of these choices present difficulties.
Suppose that an inventor patents the design of an amplifier circuit, one
element of which is described in the claims as "a vacuum tube." After the
patent issues, other scientists develop the transistor - a revolutionary
advancement, but an easy substitute for vacuum tubes in many applications,
including the patented circuit. Subsequently, a third party duplicates the
patented circuit, but avoids literal infringement by substituting a transistor for
166 If the spring, as hypothesized before, was the one thing that distinguished the patented
invention, it is less likely that the substitution of a rubber band would be considered
obvious, particularly if the patent touted the spring as superior to a rubber band.
167 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
168 See Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that a method claim is reduced to practice by performing the steps of the method).
169 Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
170 Literal infringement depends upon the meaning of the claim language to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the application. See Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[The court] consider[s] the meaning of
the claim as of the date of the invention.").
1' See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
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the vacuum tube. This would seem an ideal situation in which to apply the
doctrine of equivalents. 172 It is not the patentee's fault that the claims did not
specifically refer to transistors. Patentees cannot predict the future. The
accused infringer, adding no new insights to the information disclosed in the
patent, duplicated the essence of the invention. He might even be considered
an "unscrupulous copyist." Finally, the patent could be rendered "a hollow
and useless thing," no matter how valuable the circuit, if it were strictly limited
to vacuum tubes. Because of a tangential advancement in the electronics art,
perhaps anyone building the patented circuit would naturally substitute a
transistor.
Transistors and vacuum tubes work in different ways, perhaps substantially
different ways, but based on the reasoning and rhetoric offered in support of
the doctrine of equivalents, the right answer in this scenario seems to be that
the vacuum tube and the transistor are equivalent. In similar cases, digital
computers have been held equivalent to analog computers, 173 and on-board
satellite control systems equivalent to ground-based systems.1 74  But if
obviousness was the measure of equivalence, and the relevant perspective was
that of the time when the invention was made (or the time when the patent
application was filed), the transistor could not be considered an equivalent.
The transistor was a revolutionary development - the basis of a 1956 Nobel
Prize 175 - so it could hardly be considered an obvious substitution before it had
been invented. Equivalence would be limited to substitutions already obvious
when the claims were drafted. As to those equivalents, however, one could
more readily blame the patentee for failing to claim them explicitly.
Because the earlier temporal perspective seems to rob the doctrine of
equivalents of its best justification, the logical time to judge the obviousness of
a substitution would be the time of the infringement. But here other
difficulties arise. Let us now imagine that the patent calls for, and specifically
172 See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (referring to "after-arising technology" as "the quintessential example of an
enforceable equivalent").
173 See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1079-81 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam).
In Decca, the accused device literally infringed the claim, so the discussion apparently came
in the context of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1079. That rarely-applied
doctrine holds that a device does not infringe, even though it falls within the literal language
of the claim, if it is "so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the
same or a similar function in a substantially different way." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
17 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
But cf Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding that the totality of technological advancements made newer pocket
calculators noninfringing, even though each change in isolation might be considered the
substitution of an equivalent).
175 Physics 1956, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/physics/laureates/1956/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2007).
20071
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
claims, a resistor as a feature of the amplifier circuit. A new defendant, whom
we will call Competitor A, designs around the patent by devising a way to
substitute a diode for the resistor. This is no easy substitution. The revised
circuit requires considerable development effort, and it is contrary to the
accepted teachings of the electronics art; but the result, unexpectedly, is a more
efficient circuit with superior linearity. Competitor A has advanced the art of
circuit design in a manner potentially worthy of its own patent. Here, the
changes made by Competitor A were nonobvious, and therefore nonequivalent.
So far so good. However, now suppose that Competitor B enters the picture
and copies Competitor A's circuit. Once Competitor A's circuit has been used
in a commercial product, it becomes a part of the knowledge available to
persons of ordinary skill in the art. If Competitor B is the defendant, now the
revised circuit may be considered an equivalent because at the time of
Competitor B's infringement, thanks to Competitor A's pioneering efforts, the
changes were obvious. Competitor A, therefore, can make the revised circuit
without the permission of the patentee; Competitor B cannot make an identical
circuit.
In a way this result seems just; Competitor A made a real contribution to the
art, while Competitor B is the sort of copyist originally targeted by the doctrine
of equivalents. However, this would put Competitor A, as a competitor of
Competitor B, in a unique situation. Competitor A's advancement might be
worthy of a patent monopoly, because it satisfies the requirement of
nonobviousness. That does not mean, however, that Competitor A actually has
a patent. A patent might be unavailable because, for example, Competitor A
sold a product more than one year before filing an application, 176 or because
Competitor A was unwilling to provide a full patent disclosure, preferring to
maintain some proprietary information as a trade secret. Yet Competitor A
would still have some of the monopoly advantages of a patent, because only
Competitor A could make the revised circuit, at least without paying royalties
to the original patentee. This advantage to Competitor A might be only what it
needs to recoup its development costs; on the other hand, it seems quite
problematic to give Competitor A even this much competitive advantage
without the formalities and quid pro quo of an actual patent.
Another alternative would be to judge obviousness/equivalence at the time
the substitution was made, even if it was first made by someone other than the
defendant. In other words, if Competitor A's revisions to the patented circuit
were nonobvious at the time, neither Competitor A nor anyone else
subsequently making the same circuit would be held to infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents. This would cure the problem of Competitor A's quasi-
monopoly, but it would introduce an aspect of fortuity, as well as difficulties of
proof. If a defendant were accused of infringement by equivalence, the case
176 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless.., the
invention was. . . on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States .... ").
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might turn on when the variation was first introduced and whether it was
obvious at that time, even if the defendant had no connection with the party
responsible for it. Competitor B's liability, in other words, might turn on the
history of Competitor A, even if Competitor A was not a party to the case and
Competitor B had not copied from anyone. The advantages of an obviousness-
based equivalence inquiry, discussed in Part III, might be sufficient to justify
these headaches, but I will suggest a further alternative that seems in some
respects more practical, and perhaps best tailors the scope of the claim to the
patentee's contribution to the art.
C. A Semi-Symmetrical Alternative
Another option would be to mix the time-of-filing and time-of-infringement
perspectives to a certain extent, by asking whether, at the time the patent
application was filed, a person of ordinary skill in the art, aware of the claimed
combination and the substituted element, would have found it obvious to make
the substitution. If the answer is yes, the substitution would result in an
infringing equivalent. To return to the first example, one would ask whether,
at the time the application was filed, a person of ordinary skill in the art, aware
of the claimed amplifier circuit and of transistors, would have found it obvious
to substitute a transistor for the vacuum tube. No actual person, of course,
could have been aware of transistors at the time the patent application was
filed; they had not been invented yet. The inquiry would be purely
hypothetical, as it is when obviousness is addressed in a validity context based
on references known to few, if any, persons skilled in the art.
The hypothetical knowledge of the substituted element - in this case
transistors - makes the claim "future proof' in the sense that the discovery of
new technologies peripheral to the claimed invention, and which require no
ingenuity to substitute for a claim element, will not deprive the patentee of the
protections to which the patentee seems reasonably entitled. If substituting a
transistor for the vacuum tube would be obvious, once transistors were
available, it would be considered equivalent. On the other hand, if something
about the amplifier circuit would have made the substitution of transistors
nonobvious, even if transistors had been available, then the substitution would
not result in an equivalent. This would be true regardless of subsequent
advancements in the art that led to greater understanding of the circuit.
Returning to the second hypothetical, the substitution of the diode for the
resistor would not result in an equivalent if it would not have been obvious at
the time the patent application was filed (assuming knowledge of both the
circuit design and of diodes), and it would remain nonequivalent even after
Competitor A, through its improvement of the circuit, had added to the
knowledge available in the art.
This hybrid test presents its own difficulties. One would have to distinguish
between "knowing about transistors" and "knowing everything about
transistors, including their suitability as a substitute in the patentee's amplifier
circuit." If the latter kind of knowledge were assumed, then every substitution
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would be obvious. These kinds of problems can be minimized by
concentrating on the objective, which is to distinguish between improvements
of the patented invention and tangential developments in related arts. The
latter would include the invention of transistors - a tremendous advancement
in their own right, but not created as an improvement for a particular amplifier
circuit. Focusing on the obviousness of the substitution (e.g., replacing the
vacuum tube in this circuit with a transistor), rather than the obviousness of the
substitute (e.g., transistors in general) should reinforce this distinction while
providing the "connectedness" previously discussed. 77 It would result in the
consistent treatment of potential infringers, and protection for the patentee
from unforeseen and peripheral developments in the art. At the same time, it
would give the patentee "credit," so to speak, only for what the patentee
contributed to the art. The patentee's territory would include the invention as
explicitly claimed and substitutions that knowledge of the claimed invention
made obvious to persons skilled in the art. It would not include further
nonobvious improvements of the claimed invention. Rights to those
improvements, if they were beyond the literal scope of the patentee's claims,
would belong solely to those who discovered them.
III. THE MERITS OF A SYMMETRICAL DOCTRINE
Although the formal elegance of a symmetrical, or even semi-symmetrical,
patent doctrine might be some justification for reconsidering how equivalence
is measured, other issues are far more important. In the remainder of this
Article, I will discuss the practical advantages of an obviousness-based
inquiry, the concern that it would expand equivalency beyond a reasonable
scope, its consistency with existing doctrine, and, finally, whether defining the
boundaries of a patent in this manner would be supported by the leading
economic theories of the patent system.
177 See supra note 165 and accompanying text ("Most prior art references are
theoretically available to anyone of skill in the art exercising ordinary diligence."). A
potential substitute might be known at the time of filing, but seen as impractical because of
cost, reliability or similar issues. As long as later improvements are peripheral to the
claimed invention, one should assume knowledge of the improved substitute. For example,
Merges and Nelson point out that MOS transistor technology was known when Texas
Instruments filed its basic patent for the pocket calculator, but because it suffered from
reliability problems few firms expected it to be used in such applications. Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
858 n.86 (1990). Merges and Nelson argue that "[t]hese are the very kinds of improvements
that should be encouraged, not blocked by an overly broad pioneer patent." Id. However,
advancements in MOS technology, which can be used in a variety of applications, seem
peripheral to the calculator art. They may be worthy of encouragement, but perhaps by
limiting the scope of patents on transistors, rather than by allowing opportunists who would





The problems associated with the current analysis of equivalence, including
the indefinable nature of substantial differences, have already been
discussed.1 78 In comparison, an obviousness-based inquiry promises a more
definite, objective, and predictable measure of equivalence. 7 9
As is the case when obviousness is a validity question, fact finders judging
equivalence would have to picture themselves as different persons at a
different time, and would have to imagine their reaction to the allegedly
equivalent substitution. Would their mental state have been that of recognizing
the obvious, or something closer to surprise? It would not be a simple task, at
least in close cases, but various secondary considerations' 80 might be called
upon to aid in such an analysis. And, as in any infringement inquiry, the focus
would be on the accused product. Let us return to the amplifier circuit
hypothetical - the version where the diode substitutes for the resistor - to see
what some of those considerations might be.
Long-Felt Need. The defendant's modified circuit might fulfill a need that
the patentee's circuit, as literally claimed, did not. If the defendant's circuit,
for example, could serve as a high-fidelity amplifier in a compact low-power
music system (a need that the patentee's version of the circuit had failed to
satisfy) this would be evidence that the substitution was nonobvious.
Otherwise, other persons skilled in the art, including the patentee, should have
effected the substitution first. One would discount this particular factor if the
delay had been caused only by the unavailability of the substitute element (e.g.,
the transistor in the other hypothetical).
Praise and Skepticism. If the diode version of the circuit had received
accolades in comparison to the resistor version, or if experts had expressed
skepticism that it could be done at all (perhaps by advising against making the
effort), this would support a finding of nonobviousness.
Commercial Success. If the defendant's product achieved a level of
commercial success that eluded circuits built with the resistor, and if that
success could be attributed to the substitution, that would also serve as
evidence of nonobviousness.
Independent Development. To maintain consistency with Warner-
Jenkinson,181 infringement would not depend on whether the defendant had
"I See supra Part I.C.5 (identifying the problems associated with the current analysis of
equivalents).
79 Cianfrani, supra note 7, at 16 ("An obviousness test [of equivalence] is no more
certain than the 'insubstantial changes' test promulgated by the Federal Circuit."). Although
either is uncertain, an obviousness test should provide relative certainty because of the more
objective standard and the availability of secondary considerations.
181 See supra Part I.B (identifying some secondary considerations, for example:
commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of others).
,8I See supra Part I.C.3 (identifying as immaterial the method by which a defendant
arrives at an invention).
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worked from the teachings of the patent or had proceeded independently.
However, evidence that the incorporation of diodes in the alternative circuit
design had required a substantial effort would be further objective evidence of
nonobviousness.
Near-Simultaneous Invention. If similar substitutions of diodes for resistors
had followed close on the heels of the patentee's filing date, this might serve as
evidence that the substitution was obvious in the relevant time frame, and
remained so thereafter.
Finally, the defendant might considerably strengthen its position by
obtaining its own patent on the revised circuit. Because the new patent would
carry a presumption of validity, 82 including a presumption of nonobviousness,
it should carry great weight in the equivalence inquiry, particularly if issued by
an examiner cognizant of the plaintiff's patent as prior art. It would, however,
have to be clear that the defendant's claimed invention specifically related to
the substitution, not to some other advancement.
83
Accused infringers should be encouraged by the chance to mount a defense,
at least with respect to the doctrine of equivalents, that emphasizes the success
of their product and the ingenuity of their employees. Under the current
standard of insubstantial differences, these things are of questionable
relevance. 184 Potential defendants would also have more objective evidence at
their disposal with which to judge the risks of designing around a patent claim
or proceeding to litigation after they are accused of infringement. Of course,
there would still be uncertainty, but the relevant issue - that of obviousness -
would at least be one where an engineer or technician could offer useful
insights. Today, a potential infringer can only ask a lawyer what "insubstantial
differences" means, and the lawyer will be hard-pressed to answer. Because
an obviousness standard is more definite than an insubstantial differences
standard, it would save resources currently wasted through miscalculation, and
fewer disputes would have to be resolved through costly litigation.
B. Is Obviousness Overbroad?
Potential defendants might not be as pleased as the preceding section
suggests if they believed that replacing the insubstantial differences test with
an obviousness standard expanded the scope of equivalence. There is
something to be said for circumscribing equivalence as tightly as possible
while being true to its rationale; if equivalence is an extraordinary event, and
182 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
183 This potential defensive use of patents would also provide an additional incentive to
file applications, leading to further disclosures and enrichment of the art.
'84 Today, the commercial success of the defendant's product is most likely to be used
against it. It leads not only to higher damages awards but, potentially, to a conclusion that
the plaintiff's patent is nonobvious, if the success of the defendant's product is attributed to
its use of the patentee's invention. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip
Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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patent claims mean almost (if not exactly) what they say, then concerns
involving public notice and the proper examination of patent applications1
85
are minimized. The rhetoric associated with the doctrine of equivalents -
rhetoric which led to the insubstantial differences test - does suggest
equivalence of very limited scope. The Supreme Court in Graver Tank
referred to infringement by "minor variations," and "unimportant and
insubstantial changes" that "add[] nothing," though they avoid copying "every
literal detail" of the claimed invention. 186 "[T]rivial changes" is a phrase
employed in Festo.187 Equivalence based on obviousness may seem broader
than this; alternatives obvious to a person skilled in the art may include some
that are more than "trivially" different.
One response to this concern is that, already, the reality does not always
follow the rhetoric. It is not a "trivial" difference to control a spacecraft
through on-board computers rather than ground-based signals. 88  Digital
computers are not so much like analog computers that they "add nothing."' 89
In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission,'9" the
Federal Circuit held that the totality of changes between the plaintiffs
pioneering pocket calculator and later imported versions were sufficient to find
them nonequivalent. 19' But the court hinted that any of the changes, in
isolation, might have been equivalent, even though they included noteworthy
technological advancements - changes from thermal printers to liquid crystal
displays, bipolar to MOS transistors, and so forth. 192 That the replacements
were clearly superior did not itself preclude infringement. 93 In some cases,
stark differences are discounted because they are unimportant in the context of
the patent, something that should already shake the confidence of a potential
defendant intending to rely, for example, on technological superiority to
185 See supra Part I.C.5 (identifying public notice and proper examination of patents as
problems associated with the classical equivalents determination).
186 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
187 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
188 See Lemley, supra note 20, at 1006 (referring to on-board navigation as a "dramatic"
improvement that "revolutionized satellite technology").
189 Id.
190 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
191 Id. at 1570 ("Taken together, these accumulated differences distinguish the accused
calculators from that contemplated in the '921 patent and transcend a fair range of
equivalents of the '921 invention.").
192 See id. at 1570-71 ("Each individual difference, standing alone, could conceivably
lead to a different result, [i.e., a finding of equivalence] by application of this court's
precedent.").
193 See id. at 1568 ("As a matter of law, subsequent improvements do not in themselves
preclude a finding of infringement.").
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demonstrate nonequivalence. Indeed, even a patented difference is not
guaranteed to be a substantial difference.
1 94
Furthermore, if an obviousness test did expand equivalence in some
respects, it would narrow equivalence in others. Under the current articulation
of the standard, if a substitute turned out to perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result,
it could be found equivalent when judged at the time of the infringement, even
if the results were unexpected. Consider the situation in Warner-Jenkinson,
where the defendant's dye purification process did not literally infringe
because it was performed at a pH of 5.0, instead of the required pH level of
"approximately 6.0 to 9.0."195 The reason for the lower limit in the claim was
unclear, but may have been because the patentee expected the process to be
spoiled by foaming. 196 Under the obviousness test proposed in Part II, the
defendant's process would be found nonequivalent if, at the time the patent
application was filed, concerns over foaming would have prevented persons of
ordinary skill in the art from regarding the lower pH as an obvious alternative.
Under the insubstantial differences test, the defendant's process might be
found equivalent if foaming, after all, was not the problem it was expected to
be.
That an obviousness standard would, in some respects, contract the scope of
equivalence can be further appreciated by considering the effect of a patent
obtained by the defendant on its variation. If the patent specifically related to
the substitution, the defendant would be in a strong position to argue
nonobviousness/nonequivalence. Under the insubstantial differences
approach, the defendant might hope that the patent would be given "due
weight," 197 but its relevance would be far less clear.
Finally, the scope of equivalence is not entirely a matter of the test
employed. Under any standard, equivalence can be severely limited by
prosecution history estoppel, the prior art, and the disclosure of unclaimed
embodiments. 98 One could limit equivalence even further by excusing the
failure to claim subject matter explicitly only when the patentee had no
194 See, e.g., Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[I]t
is well established that separate patentability does not avoid equivalency as a matter of
law .. "); Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The fact of separate patentability is relevant, and is entitled to due weight. However, West
Bend's statement that there can not be infringement as a matter of law is incorrect."); Atlas
Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that the grant of a patent to an alleged infringer does not constitute prima facie
evidence of non-equivalence).
195 See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
196 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22 n.2.
197 See Nat'l Presto, 76 F.3d at 1192 ("The fact of separate patentability is relevant and is
entitled to due weight.").
18 See supra Part I.C.4 (identifying prosecution history estoppel, the prior art, and the
disclosure of unclaimed embodiments as limitations on equivalence).
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alternative - when, in other words, the vocabulary did not exist to describe the
alternative later alleged to be equivalent, or where the element later substituted
did not exist when the application was filed and could not have been
foreseen. 99 A finding of equivalence could be a very rare event, perhaps
limited to situations much like the hypothetical where the patentee could not
predict the invention of the transistor. In any case, there is nothing about an
obviousness standard which would mandate a doctrine of equivalents run
rampant.
C. Consistency with Precedent
In Atlas Powder Co. v. E. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,200 defendant Du
Pont manufactured an explosive employing sodium oleate, formed in situ, as
an emulsifying agent.20 The plaintiffs patent, by its literal terms, required a
different emulsifying agent. 202 Du Pont pointed out that its own product, and
the process of producing it in situ, had been patented.20 3 This, argued Du Pont,
should serve as prima facie evidence that its product and the plaintiff's were
nonequivalent. 20 4 The Federal Circuit disagreed.
The court premised its conclusion on a comparison to literal infringement.
If a patent claims the combination A + B + C, a defendant selling A + B + C +
D infringes.20 5 If, for example, the patentee claims a combination of elements
that together form a mousetrap, the defendant still infringes if it sells the same
combination of elements but adds a bell. By the same token, the court held, if
the patentee claims A + B + C and the defendant sells A + B + C' (C' being an
"equivalent" of C), the defendant still infringes, even if A + B + C' were
patented. 20 6 Whether Du Pont makes A + B + C + D or A + B + C', Du Pont
199 In Festo, the Supreme Court placed an equivalent burden on the patentee in the
context of prosecution history estoppel: "The patentee must show that at the time of the
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim
that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent." 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002).
In Johnson & Johnston, Judge Rader's concurring opinion suggested a more general rule
limiting equivalents to variations that the patentee, when drafting the claims, could not have
foreseen. 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The reconciling principle is simple: the
doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably
could have foreseen during the application process and included in the claims.").
200 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
201 Id. at 1572 ("The team succeeded in making a water-in-oil emulsion blasting agent
which Du Pont began making and selling in August 1978.")
202 Id. at 1579.
203 Id. at 1580.
204 Id.
205 Id. ("Dupont concedes that, if Atlas patents A + B + C and Du Pont then patents the
improvement A + B + C + D, Du Pont is liable to Atlas for any manufacture, use, or sale of
A+B+C+D .... ).
206 Id. (holding that Du Pont infringes if its product contains an equivalent or an
additional new piece).
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has used the gist of Atlas' invention to devise a patentable composition.
Accordingly, there is no compelling reason to hold Du Pont liable for
infringement in one instance but not in the other.
207
The court's lack of interest in Du Pont's patent suggests that a variation can
be nonobvious but still equivalent. However, a few things in the court's
opinion are worth noting. First, the logic has an element of tautology. Du
Pont, in the court's words, urged it to find the patented A + B + C'
noninfringing "even though A + B + C' is 'equivalent' to A + B + C."
20 8 Of
course it infringes if it is "equivalent"; a better way to frame the argument
would be to say that if there are patentable differences, the variation is not
equivalent at all. The comparison to literal infringement is also suspect. If the
patentee claims A + B + C, and the claim is not in the rare form that limits the
patentee to these elements and no others,20 9 then A + B + C + D is precisely
what the patentee claimed. That Du Pont combined A + B + C' contrary to the
requirements of the claim might be regarded as a "compelling reason" to
contemplate a different result. In support of its argument, the court quotes a
Sixth Circuit opinion from 1911:
Another reason sometimes advanced for supposing that the structure of
the second does not infringe the claim of the first patent is that the Patent
Office has declared that a patentable difference exists. The premise is
sound, but not the conclusion. In examining the second application, the
Patent Office has no concern with the scope of the claim of the first, and
does not and must not pay any attention thereto. It is concerned only with
the early disclosure by the specification and drawings. Patentable
difference does not of itself tend to negative infringement. It may just as
well be based upon infringement, plus improvement; and improvement
may lie in addition, simplification, or variance.
210
This reasoning makes sense as applied to literal infringement. If the Patent
Office were considering the patentability of A + B + C + D, it would compare
this combination to the teachings of the earlier patent, best communicated in
the preferred embodiments. The scope of the earlier claim A + B + C would
be immaterial to the validity of the later claim. An improver who makes a
nonobvious addition to a prior combination is entitled to a patent, even though
the second patent is dominated by the claims of the first. The result is a case of
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Claim preambles typically end with the word "comprising," which means that a
product is within the scope of the claim if it includes the claim elements listed, alone or in
combination with additional elements. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d
1173, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that a claim is not limited to "devices containing only
the structures of the embodiments specifically described in the specification").
210 Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 585 (6th Cir. 1911). The court in
Herman appears to be focusing on literal infringement, where there is no contradiction
between the patentability of the defendant's product and its infringement of an earlier claim.
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blocking patents; neither party can practice A + B + C + D without the
permission of the other.211 The situation of A + B + C' is somewhat different.
The Patent Office would still concern itself with the teachings of the first
patent, rather than the claims, but this is comparable to what a court does later
when considering the doctrine of equivalents. The court looks past the words
of the claim, seeking instead the essence, or as the Atlas Powder opinion says,
the "gist" of the invention: something the claims could not convey precisely,
but that is implicit in the teachings of the patent. Hence, the kind of
comparison that occurs when the Patent Office considers patentability is much
closer to a doctrine of equivalents analysis than it is to a literal infringement
inquiry. To find a difference equivalent when the Patent Office has found the
same difference patentable appears contradictory.
21 2
If Atlas Powder seems inconsistent with a measure of equivalence based on
obviousness (due to the court's dismissal of Du Pont's patent), subsequent
Federal Circuit precedent is more accommodating. On various occasions, the
court has treated the patentability of the defendant's variation as relevant to the
substantiality of the differences and entitled to "due weight" in an equivalence
inquiry.21 3 To admit even the relevance of the defendant's patent signals a
departure from Atlas Powder; if the substitution of an equivalent element were
no different than adding to the elements literally claimed, then the defendant's
patent would logically have no relevance whatsoever. To make obviousness
the determinative factor under the doctrine of equivalents would require the
Federal Circuit to go further.
In Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works,214 Judge Nies, in a concurring
opinion, expressed her readiness to "apply nonobviousness as the test for [an]
'insubstantial change.' ' 215 Echoing the algebraic language of Atlas Powder,
she wrote:
211 See Lemley, supra note 20, at 1009-10 ("Should the original patent owner try to use
the patented improvement, the significant improver can sue him for damages and an
injunction. This situation is known as the case of 'blocking patents."'); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 177, at 860-61 (explaining that neither the "dominant" nor the "subservient"
patent owner are capable of selling its product without a license from the other party).
212 The court admits that a patent based on "unexpected results" would be relevant to
equivalence. Atlas Powder Co., 750 F.2d at 1580 n.3 ("Of course, if A + B + C' were
patented because of unexpected results, those unexpected results might prompt a finding of
no equivalence."). Then the accused combination would produce a "substantially different
result" under the Graver Tank tripartite test of equivalence. One might wonder how a patent
could be granted in a case of "expected results," but apparently the Du Pont combination,
even if patentably different, produced results similar to those achieved by the first patentee.
213 Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see
also Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The nonobviousness
of the accused device, evidenced by the grant of a United States patent, is relevant to the
issue of whether the change therein is substantial.").
214 79 F.3d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
215 Id. at 1128 (Nies, J., Additional Views).
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If the second patent requires practice of the first i.e., the second merely
adds an element "D" to a patented combination A+B+C, the combination
A+B+C+D clearly infringes. Conversely, if the second patent is granted
for A+B+D over one claiming A+B+C, the change from C to D must not
have been obvious to be validly patented. Evidence of a patent covering
the change, in my view, is clearly relevant unless the patent is invalid. A
substitution in a patented invention cannot be both nonobvious and
insubstantial.
21 6
The Supreme Court has encouraged the Federal Circuit to devise its own
linguistic framework for the equivalence analysis. 217  A shift from an
insubstantial differences test, as it is currently applied, to an obviousness test
involves more than a choice of vocabulary, but it is worth considering whether
the Supreme Court's own precedent would support or preclude the approach
suggested by Judge Nies.
The oldest Supreme Court cases precede the adoption of nonobviousness as
the standard of patentability. Had the timing been reversed, one wonders if
obviousness would have been the test originally associated with the doctrine of
equivalents. In Winans, the Court, discussing "change[s] of form," suggests a
symmetry between the standard of patentability and the standard of
equivalence. Putting words in the mouth of a hypothetical patentee, the Court
states:
[M]y improvement did not consist in a change of form, but in the new
employment of principles or powers, in a new mode of operation,
embodied in a form by means of which a new or better result is produced;
it was this which constituted my invention; this you have copied,
changing only the form; and that answer is justly applicable to this
patent.218
In other words, more than a "change of form" is necessary to secure a
patent, and more than a "change of form" is necessary to avoid infringement.
The Court also refers to "the substance of the invention," identified as "that
which entitled the inventor to this patent" and which, if found in an accused
product, mandates a finding of infringement. 219 On the other hand, the Court
describes an infringing equivalent as one similar enough to "substantially...
embody the patentee's mode of operation" and "attain the same kind of result"
- language more reminiscent of a substantial differences test than an
obviousness test.220
216 Id. (emphasis added).
217 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in
the orderly course of case-by-case determinations ... .
218 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1853).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 344.
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Graver Tank also precedes the explicit adoption of an obviousness test of
patentability. Although the Court did not use the word "obvious" to describe
changes that are unimportant or insubstantial, the decisive evidence,
interestingly, turns as much on the knowledge or understanding of persons
skilled in the art, as it does on the differences themselves.
It is difficult to conceive of a case more appropriate for application of the
doctrine of equivalents than Graver Tank. The disclosures of the prior art
made clear that manganese silicate was a useful ingredient in welding
compositions. Specialists familiar with the problems of welding compositions
understood that manganese was equivalent to and could be substituted for
magnesium in the composition of the patented flux and their observations were
confirmed by the literature of chemistry.
221
What seems important in Graver Tank is not just the similarity of
manganese and magnesium, but the extent to which that similarity was already
known to the art and available to be exploited. The objective factor
emphasized in Graver Tank and many subsequent cases is whether the
defendant used a known substitute for the element literally claimed. 222 The
Court notes an absence of evidence that the defendant had developed its
alternative "as the result of independent research or experiments" 223 - further
evidence that the substitution of manganese was a known alternative. Graver
Tank leaves much room for interpretation, but it seems that equivalence
depends not just on whether A is similar to B, but also on whether the
substitution of A for B is already routine or whether it requires a further
advancement in the art. Perhaps the result in Graver Tank would have been
different if the defendant, with much ingenuity and to the general surprise of
the art, had discovered that magnesium and manganese perform substantially
the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the
same result.
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court again emphasizes the important role of
knowledge in deciding what is equivalent. Independent experimentation by the
defendant is relevant, the Court holds, not because copying is required to
infringe, but because if the defendant already knows that A can substitute for
B, without having to experiment, others skilled in the art may possess the same
knowledge. 224 On the other hand, the Court states that "a skilled practitioner's
knowledge of the interchangeability between claimed and accused elements is
not relevant for its own sake, but rather for what it tells the fact finder about
221 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1949).
222 Id. at 609 ("An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would
have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one
that was.").
223 Id. at 611.
224 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("The need for independent experimentation thus could reflect knowledge - or lack thereof
- of interchangeability possessed by one presumably skilled in the art.").
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the similarities or differences between those elements. '225  The Court's
reasoning here is opaque. If the differences between A and B are what is really
important, those differences exist whether anyone is aware of them or not.
Purifying dyes at a pH of 5.0 either produces the same result as a higher pH
level or a different result. Proof of a similar result could be in the form of
experiments long-known in the art or a new test conducted specifically for
purposes of the litigation. How, then, is known interchangeability relevant at
all? The Court's only explanation is that "the perspective of a skilled
practitioner provides content to, and limits on, the concept of 'equivalence.'
226
How it does this is unclear. The skilled practitioner's "perspective" by itself
provides no content or limitation if the standard is "insubstantial
differences. '227  If obviousness were the standard for equivalence, the
importance of the skilled practitioner's perspective and knowledge would be
much easier to understand. Ultimately, the Court did not choose any particular
standard, other than the unhelpful "essential inquiry: Does the accused product
or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of
the patented invention?"
228
While the Festo decision is no more illuminating on this issue, it
characterizes an invention as an idea - a concept that, on occasion, cannot be
captured in words, but that others skilled in the art are capable of
understanding and, if the law is inflexible, exploiting. 229 Sometimes language
cannot adequately describe "the range of [the invention's] novelty. 2 30 If the
reason for the doctrine of equivalents is, in the words of Festo, "language's
inability to capture the essence of innovation" 231 - an essence coincident with
the "range of its novelty" - a logical corrective would be an obviousness
standard of equivalence. A patent disclosure contributes to the art whatever it
communicates explicitly and whatever it renders obvious in the context of
information already available. That penumbra of obviousness may be the
hardest part of the contribution to capture in claim language, but it is still
within the bounds of the invention. In contrast, a modification requiring
further inventive effort exceeds the patentee's contribution to the art, and
225 Id. at 37. The perspective from which to judge equivalence, and hence knowledge of
interchangeability, is the time of the alleged infringement. Id. ("[T]he proper time for
evaluating equivalency.., is at the time of infringement.
226 Id.
227 See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
228 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
229 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2001)
("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing
in a patent application. The inventor who chooses to patent an invention... bears the risk
that others will devote their efforts toward exploiting the limits of the patent's language.").
230 Id.
231 Id. at 734.
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perhaps the patentee's ability to argue that the essence of the invention
remains.
In short, adopting obviousness as the standard of equivalence would require
some adjustments, but not necessarily a wholesale revision of existing
doctrine. Both the insubstantial differences test and the tripartite
function/way/result test could still play a useful role. If there are important
differences between A and B in function, way, or result, it is less obvious to
substitute A for B. However, the differences between A and B would shed
light on the obviousness of the substitution, not the other way around. If this
reverses current practice, it also adds a degree of logic. The particular
obviousness test suggested in Part II judges the obviousness of the substitution
as of the time the patent application was filed, contrary to the current rule that
looks to the time of the alleged infringement. 232 Yet once the rule is qualified
by assuming knowledge of the substituted element, this difference also may
not be as important as it would first appear.
D. Consistency with Theory
The classic economic theory of patent law, recognizable in the constitutional
language "to promote the Progress of Science and useful ArtS, ' 2 33 is reward
theory. 234 When an inventor produces a technological advancement that is
new, useful, and nonobvious, the inventor's "reward" is an exclusive right to
make, use, or sell the invention - a right that may translate into supra-
competitive profits, if the invention has no ready substitutes in the
marketplace. Any monopoly imposes costs on society,235 but the reward
theory postulates that these costs are more than outweighed by the benefits of
innovation. Without the protection of exclusive rights, inventors would fear
that the fruits of their labor would be enjoyed by others, leading to reduced
investments in technological advancement.236
The doctrine of equivalents can be justified as a guardian of the inventor's
reward. If, as the Supreme Court suggested in Festo, language, through no
232 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37 ("[T]he proper time for evaluating equivalency
- and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements - is at the time of
infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.").
233 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
234 See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305, 310 (1992) (identifying reward theory as a more traditional method of
understanding patent law); Lemley, supra note 20, at 993 ("While there are a number of
noneconomic theories offered to explain both copyright and patent law, both the United
States Constitution and judicial decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive
theory in justifying intellectual property.").
235 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
236 See Cotropia, supra note 9, at 169-70 ("Without the ability to control the invention,
the inventor could not demand the price for her invention needed to recoup her costs and
turn a profit.").
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fault of the patentee, sometimes fails to capture the essence of an invention,
inventors will be denied their reward if they are limited to the precise language
of the claims. By substituting an equivalent, rivals could use the teachings of
the patent - the product of the patentee's labor - to compete with the patentee
in the marketplace. That competition may deny the patentee expected profits,
or even a chance to recoup the costs of the invention. Should this happen too
often, inventors would find innovation so unprofitable that the technological
arts would languish.
237
If this is the essential function of the doctrine of equivalents, an obviousness
standard has a definite appeal. The reward associated with a patent should be
commensurate in scope with the inventor's contribution to the art,238 a
contribution which includes obvious variations of what the patentee claimed.
Those obvious variations, by definition, are a part of what a patentee puts
within the reach of any person of ordinary skill. If their rights did not extend
to those variations, patentees would be exposed to the hazards described
above; competitors could use the teachings of the patent to develop, at the
patentee's expense, rival products to undermine the patentee's profits. On the
other hand, competitors who develop nonobvious variations of the patentee's
invention are not exploiting the teachings of the patent to the same extent.239
They are, in fact, advancing the art themselves, according to the same standard
applied to the patentee. They, perhaps, should be entitled to enjoy their own
reward, without owing anything to the patentee whose claims they do not
literally infringe.
240
237 See Lemley, supra note 20, at 994 ("In a private market economy, individuals will not
invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of
doing so - that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.").
238 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 177, at 913 ("It is basic to the grant of a patent that
the scope of the patent should not exceed the scope of the invention.").
239 In In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C. Pa. 1970), the court observed that a patentee
"should be allowed to dominate the future patentable inventions of others where those
inventions were based in some way on his teachings." Even if the improvements are
nonobvious, they are "still within [the patentee's] contribution, since the improvement was
made possible by his work." Id. However, to borrow Professor Merges's analogy, an
earlier invention is only the "but-for cause" of nonobvious improvements, not the
"proximate cause." See Robert M. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District:
Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REv. 359, 363 n.15 (1992). Hence,
whether the argument is based on fundamental fairness or the tailoring of the economic
incentive, the case for dominating nonobvious improvements is a weaker one, particularly
when those improvements are beyond the scope of what the patentee claimed explicitly.
240 "Patent law must consider the impact of maintaining the incentive for one inventor on
the incentives for potential inventors to follow - those who will be building from, or
improving upon, the initial invention." Cotropia, supra note 9, at 179. Improvers may
hesitate to proceed if they face the prospect of infringing an earlier patent. Id. at 182
("Almost every inventor is following another's technological development, and protection
for after-arising equivalents deters these follow-on inventions."). An improver who could
obtain a patent on the improvement would have some leverage for bargaining with the
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Alternative theories of patent law focus less on the patent reward as a spur
to creativity and more on the efficient use of resources to exploit a particular
innovation. Edmund Kitch's "prospect theory" is of this type.24 1  Kitch
compared a patent to the territory allotted to a prospector who stakes a claim.
The effect of granting an exclusive right is to put in the hands of one party the
task of organizing the efficient exploration of the land.242 Without that control,
wasteful duplication could occur as numerous prospectors, not all of whom
will succeed, rush to exploit the treasure. Or the prospector who first
suspected the presence of gold in the hills might expend needless resources on
keeping the discovery a secret.243 He might hesitate to deal with those who
could most efficiently find or extract the gold, fearing they would take the
treasure for themselves. 244 The rights associated with the prospector's claim
prevent these inefficient outcomes. Similarly, patents allow a single party -
the inventor - to organize the exploitation of the invention with a minimum of
waste.
245
Generally speaking, Kitch's prospect theory supports generous patent rights.
A broader patent means a larger territory protected from the evils of inefficient
exploitation. In an influential article, Robert Merges and Richard Nelson voice
skepticism of Kitch's theory, particularly if the patentee's rights are so broad
that they encompass significant improvements to the basic invention.
246
Competition, they argue, provides the most effective incentive for rapid and
original patentee, because neither could practice the improved invention without the
permission of the other. See id. at 198-99 ("The follow-on inventor, can, in this instance,
use her patent to block the existing patentee from practicing her development, forcing a
bargaining situation."); Lemley, supra note 20, at 1009-10 ("The original patent owner can
prevent the improver from using his patented technology, but the improver can also prevent
the original patent owner from using the improvement."). However, the improver who will
owe nothing to the original patentee has a stronger incentive.
241 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 265 (1977) ("This essay argues that the patent system performs a function not
previously noted: to increase the output from resources used for technological innovation.").
242 See id. at 276 ("[A] patent 'prospect' increases the efficiency with which investment
in innovation can be managed.").
243 See id. at 279 ("A patent system covering all the useful arts provides a uniform
structure of incentives without regard to the possibility of economic exploitation in secret.").
244 See id. at 277-78 (identifying the practical difficulties of entering into contracts to
preserve trade secrets).
245 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 234, at 314 ("Both systems... lower the
claimant's cost of maintaining control over the valuable discovered resource."); Lemley,
supra note 20, at 1046 ("[T]he primary point of the patent system is to encourage further
commercialization and efficient use of as yet unrealized ideas by patenting them, just as
privatizing land will encourage the owner to make efficient use of it.").
246 Merges & Nelson, supra note 177, at 843 ("However, contrary to what Kitch
suggests, we do not presume that granting broad scope to an initial inventor induces more
effective development and future invention.").
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creative improvement. 247 The benefits to society of more vigorous exploration
outweigh any waste that may occur. Consequently, Merges and Nelson
advocate an infringement analysis that permits rivals of the patentee substantial
freedom to improve upon the claimed invention. They suggest, for example, a
symmetrical approach to infringement which takes into consideration the
magnitude of the technological advancements embodied in the accused
product.
248
An equivalence standard based on obviousness would do exactly that.
Obvious variations of the claimed invention - variations that require little in
the way of additional development because they are, indeed, obvious - would
fall within the scope of the patent. Within that territory, the patentee could
manage the efficient exploitation of the invention. Beyond the realm of
obvious variations, where further inventive effort is required, the rivalry that
Merges and Nelson see as essential to technological advancement would have
free rein. Choosing obviousness as the cut-off, rather than an improvised
measure like "significant improvement" or "radical improvement, 249 has clear
advantages. It is a standard already familiar in patent jurisprudence, it is
247 Id. at 843-44, 877 (arguing that, at the margin, the law should favor a competitive
environment to promote efficiency); Merges, supra note 239, at 372-73 ("Invention of
improvements, like all invention, is an expensive and unpredictable activity, and the more
approaches that are tried the more likely it is that the technical advances will be made.").
Although even monopolists have incentives to innovate, competition offers both the "carrot"
of success and the "stick" of failure at the hands of a more industrious rival. See Merges &
Nelson, supra note 177, at 872 ("For one thing, under rivalrous competition in invention and
innovation there is a stick as well as a carrot."). Competition also means that more creative
minds are working on the same problems, perhaps exploring different paths. See id. at 873-
74 ("But we would expect a single rightholder to underdevelop - or even ignore totally -
many of the potential improvements encompassed by their broad property right."). Oddi
calls the Merges and Nelson approach the "race-to-invent" theory, based on the premise that
"faster is better." Oddi, supra note 1, at 282.
248 Merges & Nelson, supra note 177, at 910 ("The equivalents inquiry.., should be
centered around whether the improved structures of the accused device show major
differences from the structures disclosed in the original specification."). The source of the
"symmetry" to which they refer is the increased scope of equivalents afforded to "pioneer
patents" - patents on technological breakthroughs inaugurating entirely new fields of
endeavor. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("The wide range of technological advance between pioneer breakthrough and modest
improvement accommodates gradations in scope of equivalency."). The reason for the
increased scope may be simply that equivalence, in the case of a pioneer patent, is less
hemmed in by the prior art. See Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (holding that, in the absence of constraining prior art, pioneers acquire broader claims
than non-pioneers).
249 See Lemley, supra note 20, at 1007-08 (describing the differing treatments of
significant improvers and minor improvers under patent doctrine); see also Cotropia, supra
note 9, at 183 (discussing how a radical improvement will not infringe because it falls
outside of the range of equivalents).
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accompanied by useful and well-established "secondary considerations," and it
is the one measure of inventiveness fundamental enough to have been
incorporated in the Patent Act itself If nonobviousness is the price of
receiving a patent, there is a certain logic in making it also the price of
avoiding another patent, at least insofar as the doctrine of equivalents is
concerned.
25 0
Grady and Alexander refined Kitch's prospect approach by analyzing the
dangers of "rent dissipation. '251 By "rent" they meant the difference in value
between the costs associated with producing and commercializing an
invention, and the ultimate value of that invention to society.252 The inventor's
opportunity to pocket that difference, by charging for the use of the invention,
is the "reward" that spurs innovation. 253 Society comes out ahead as long as
the resources consumed in inventive activities are less than the benefits
received; to put it in prospecting terms, as long as the costs associated with a
prospector and his burrow are less than the value of the gold he discovers. The
rent is "dissipated," and the value of the discovery to society undermined, if
the promise of reward attracts the expenditure of too many resources. 254 If too
many prospectors head into the hills, the aggregate costs may meet or exceed
the value of what they could discover.255 Similarly, the costs of too many
researchers in too many laboratories could exceed the value of the inventions
they might develop, or at least consume the rent that makes exploration
worthwhile.256
250 A defendant's patent does not prevent literal infringement because additions, even
additions that may be patentable, do not prevent the defendant's product from falling within
the previously claimed genus. Patentable changes are another matter. See supra Part III.C
(concluding that an addition does not prevent infringement).
251 Grady & Alexander, supra note 234, at 308 ("The defect in [rent dissipation] is that if
multiple inventors expend resources in competition for the patent monopoly, the benefit to
society of having the invention will be dissipated by the cost of numerous, redundant
development efforts."); see also Merges, supra note 239, at 370-71 (concluding that a
danger posed by rent dissipation is wasteful duplication).
252 Grady & Alexander, supra note 234, at 308 ("The difference between what society
would pay for an innovation and its actual cost of development - the rent - is awarded to the
inventor in the form of a monopoly right .... ).
253 See id. at 308 (claiming that if rent was not awarded to the inventor, "competition by
imitators would discourage innovation by making it unprofitable").
254 Id. at 307-08 ("In the perverse equilibrium that would result from a system awarding
full control to the inventor who is first, the cost of developing dreams that ultimately fail
would equal or exceed the benefit to society of those that succeed.").
255 See id. at 314-15 ("In a gold rush, however, a single lucky prospector wins big, and
then society loses as follow-on prospectors bid resources from higher valued uses outside
the prospecting industry to lower valued ones inside it.").
256 See id. at 308 (characterizing as "redundant" the efforts of too many researchers
attempting to patent the same invention simultaneously).
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Critics of Kitch's theory have observed that the excess expenditure of
resources can occur before the prospector, or inventor, stakes a claim.
257 If
claims are highly valuable, as they would be if afforded the broad reach that
Kitch's analysis suggests, then there could be wasteful rivalry on the part of
those seeking to be first to stake a claim. Perhaps too many resources would
be spent on basic research, in the hopes of finding patentable inventions.
258
Hence, even if one emphasizes the efficient organization of resources rather
than the healthy psychological effects of competition, determining the optimal
scope of a patent means balancing the post-invention rent dissipation that
occurs when rights are too narrow against the pre-invention rent dissipation
that occurs when rights are too broad.
Grady and Alexander emphasize the effects of "signaling" in striking the
most advantageous balance. 259 Even breakthrough inventions, they argue,
receive little in the way of patent protection if they are so perfect, so "elegant,"
that they suggest or "signal" little in the way of potential improvement. 260 In
those cases, the dangers of post-invention inefficiency are minimal; the
invention is done, and there is no further exploration to manage. If rights were
granted to those elegant inventions, they would be so valuable as to encourage
the wasteful expenditure of pre-invention resources. In contrast, patent rights
are broadest where the invention is least perfected.
26'
Even if one does not accept the counterintuitive proposition that the most
perfect inventions should receive the least reward, the concept of signaling is
worth considering. The potential improvements most clearly signaled by a
patent are the obvious improvements. Those, by definition, are recognizable to
anyone of ordinary skill, and are ripe for the picking. 262 If these strongly-
257 See id. at 3 16-17 (identifying several academics who argue that "a competition for the
right to develop prospects would completely dissipate the rents from innovations").
25 See id. at 306 (explaining that patents "encourage hopeful inventors to squander
valuable social resources in the race to win the patent").
259 Id. at 309 (identifying signaling as a means of preserving rewards for innovation
while controlling innovation's distorting effects).
260 Grady and Alexander claim that they are explaining what the courts have done, rather
than advocating what they should do. See id. ("At its core, our theory seeks to identify an
underlying unity that explains the seemingly disorderly patent results.").
261 See id. at 320-21 ("As the value of the invention increases, the case for patentability
weakens because the large monopoly rent conferred on the inventor tends to encourage rent
dissipation at the preinvention stage .... ); Oddi, supra note 1, at 289 ("Accordingly, rent
dissipation would seem to suggest a narrow scope of protection for low benefit/cost (detail)
inventions, because most of the improvements have presumably already been signaled.").
262 Some who have commented on the Grady & Alexander thesis wonder how to tell
whether an invention signals the potential for improvement or does not. See Oddi, supra
note 1, at 285 ("One also would be suspicious of a counter-intuitive theory that predicts the
invalidity of a patent on an elegant invention (categorized as being unimprovable) and that
predicts validity of a patent on an inelegant (detail) invention because it somehow signals
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signaled alternatives are not within the scope of the patent but still valuable,
one can expect resources to be spent by rivals in their development. 263 These
expenditures may be wastefully duplicative if beyond the patentee's ability to
manage, and they cannot be as easily justified; because the development of
obvious variations does not rise to the level of invention, there is less need for
the invigorating effects of rivalry. In short, if efficiency is the chief concern in
delineating the scope of equivalence, obviousness seems as good a place as any
to draw the line.
CONCLUSION
Whether one views the doctrine of equivalents as an enlightened policy or a
maddening contradiction, it is clear that it will be a part of patent doctrine for
many years to come. It would be less problematic if it were not so
frustratingly imprecise, a problem that can be attributed, in large measure, to
the elusive standard of insubstantial differences. If an obviousness standard of
equivalence seems less anchored to the literal claim language, the difference is
more theoretical than real, given how broadly "insubstantial" can be
interpreted. An obviousness standard would be comparatively objective, and it
would make available various "secondary considerations" to assist the fact
finder - what was "sauce for the goose," when the issue was validity,
becoming "sauce for the gander," when the issue is equivalence. An
obviousness standard would match well with the rationale for the doctrine, of
equivalents, as well as the economic theories used to describe and justify
patent doctrine. The patentee's reward would be preserved from attack, yet
circumscribed by the patentee's contribution to the advancement of the art.
Improvements would be encouraged, protected, and rewarded. Finally, an
obviousness standard of equivalence would make validity and infringement
more symmetrical, a result both aesthetically pleasing and useful for
understanding patent law, not as a patchwork of conflicting ideas, but as a
consistent, rational, and unified body of law.
improvements."). If the relevant improvements are the obvious ones, the solution is found
in the knowledge available to persons of ordinary skill.
263 The costs of developing obvious variations may be lower than the costs of developing
nonobvious variations; the former are easier to produce. But more rivals are attracted to the
prospect of developing obvious alternatives - because of the lower costs to each rival, the
larger pool of effective competitors, and the relative certainty of success - so, in the
aggregate, the rent associated with the original invention may be as effectively, if not more
effectively, dissipated.
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